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This is a study of American reactions to United Nations
sanctions against Rhodesia 1965-1977. It examines in par
ticular the reaction of four American administrations
(Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter) towards Ian Smith's minor
ity regime.
The study is based on a review of the literature in
books, journals and newspapers on American policy towards
Rhodesia and the entire Southern Africa Sub-Continent.
Chapter I looks at the theory of sanctions, defines and
looks at conditions under which economic sanctions will be
effective or ineffective.
Chapter II presents a chronological account of American
reactions to U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia under the
Johnson administration, following the 1965 Unilateral decla
ration of Independence. It traces the growing gap between
the Johnson administration's anti-minority regime rhetoric
and its more limited anti-Smith action.
Chapter III looks at American reaction during the Nixon
and Ford years. This chapter is called the "Kissingerian
Period" due to the dominance of the Secretary of State in
international affairs, and it traces the shift in American
rhetorical support of U.N. sanctions to a policy of "Com
munications" and contact with the racist minority regime of
Southern Africa.
Chapter IV examines the changes in the Carter admini
stration from "Communications" to a return of rhetorical
support of United Nations Sanctions on Rhodesia.
Chapter V illustrates American complicity in the erosion
of U.N. sanctions by U.S. corporations. It also lists and
discusses sanction breaking activities by U.S. government.
Chapter VI, concludes that the major differences in
these four administrations were rhetorical. The Carter and
Johnson administrations appeared to support sanctions but
offered no concrete support against the.illegal minority
regime in Rhodesia. In the "Kissingerian Period" there was
actual opposition to sanctions. The study thus concludes
that the United States under all four administrations was
consistently committed to preserving the status quo in
Rhodesia.
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1. Rhodesian Economic Indicators, 1965-1977
iv
INTRODUCTION
When Ian Smith issued his Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in 1965 most experts foretold speedy disaster
for his regime. Britain, with Commonwealth co-operation,
can strangle Rhodesia's economy over a period of months
argued the New York Times. The Economist was equally cer
tain in predicting Rhodesiafs economic demise:
The trade and financial sanctions imposed in
November and December are now making their im
pact on the ordinary white Rhodesian family,
the journal claimed barely two months after
U.D.I. White Rhodesians have begun to lose
their jobs. In another month or so, many
small businesses will start going to the wall.
If the rebellion survives to the end of March
(1966), which it just might if the rebels are
determined to hold out to the last drum of
petrol...then nearly 10 percent of Rhodesia's
white wage and salary earners could find
themselves out of work.2
Smith's position was indeed so desperate that London
should make the first move in starting talks, so as to offer
Salisbury a graceful way to surrender. Smith's challenge to
the world was the equivalent of throwing a lighted fuse into
York Times, November 12, 19^5» P*
2The Economist, January 8, 1966, p. 83.
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a powder magazine. Unless speedily extinguished the illegal
Rhodesian regime would produce a terrible explosion. Race
war might break out, with horrendous consequences.
Successful Rhodesian resistence was inconceivable. How
could a white population numbering barely 220,000 people,
fewer than the inhabitants of a provincial town in England,
maintain their rule over nearly 5 million Africans-much less
take on the world at large? Portugal was too weak to help,
South Africa too frightened of its own internal troubles.
Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies alike, argued a well
known-American Sociologist in a book first published in 1965*
were already near collapse, within five years at the most
revolutionary change would probably come to South Africa it
self.^
On the face of it, these predictions seemed reasonable
enough. In 19-66 Rhodesia was largely dependent on foreign
commerce. Something like 35 to 40 percent of its gross
domestic product derived from exports, of which a large pro
portion went to the United Kingdom. Many of the Rhodesian
goods sold abroad consisted of a few commodities like to
bacco, whose origins purchasers could easily identify.
Rhodesia had no domestic source of oil. The Rhodesian cur-
3L.H. Gann, "Rhodesia and the Prophet," African Affairs
(April 19?2), P. 125-
^Pierre Van de Berghe, South Africa; A Study in Con
flict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976),
p. 263.
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rency appeared subject to foreign pressure and might easily
lose all its value in a runaway inflation. Rhodesia's
military strength was minuscule by world standards. The
Rhodesian wartime establishment amounted to two infantry
brigades, some supporting troops, and an airforce with no
more than five squadrons. Rhodesia"s total defense expendi
ture was less than half of Ghana's barely more than one-sixth
of Algeria's, and one twenty-eight of the military budget
maintained by the United Arab Republic.-5
There was also the intangible factor of morale. In
Victorian and Edwardian days, academic and official opinion
had commonly idealized the settler as the pioneer of empire
and of middle class standards in the lonely veld. After the
second world war, this ill-considered stereotype was replaced
by another equally inaccurate one. The settler often became
the prototype of the Philistine, the parasite, or even the
mentally aberrant. Rhodesia was supposedly run by 'the New
Bourbon;1 it was a land where -the neurotics commanded the
citadel.'6
The literary image of the settler in Africa, strangely
compounded Old South and New Suburbia, probably helped to
further distort power assessments concerning Southern Africa.
^David Wood, The Armed Forces of the African States,
Adelphi Paper No. 2, April 1966 (London: Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1966), PP« 28-29.
Patrick Keatley, The_PpJJ:tics^f^^ (Harmonds-
worth, 1963), P- 271-
A handful of backvelders had ignorantly challenged the Queen's
Government, the might of all independent Africa, the United
Nations, world opinion, and the irresistible tide of history.
But faced with real hardship or danger, they would soon col
lapse. Harold Wilson thus seemed well advised when he proph
esied early in 1966 that the rebellion might end fwithin a
n
matter of weeks rather than months.1
For more than twelve years the Rhodesian economy did not
cave in. On the contrary, the country's gross domestic pro
duct has grown despite the sanctions imposed on the territory
by the United Nations.
Table 6.1 presents key indicators of how they changed in
the first twelve years of sanctions, 1965-1977*
What has brought about this impressive reflutation of
the prophets' forecasts? To understand the reasons why in
ternational sanctions failed to bring down the Smith regime
for twelve years, we look at the historical developments that
led to sanctions. Again we see the crucial role that the
Western World has played. It was Britain's attitude which
led to the betrayal of Lobegula and which allowed, without
an ounce of protest or a veto, the steady erosion of African
rights. Again at the time of U.D.I, in 1965, Britain with
the help of the United States, stalled, blocked pretended
and did everything else possible to maintain the status quo
^Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, Final
Communique, Lagos, Nigeria, January 1966, CMND 289O.
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in Rhodesia. In most other British colonial situations, they
never hestitated to use force to put down "rebellions against
the crown," as they did in India, Malaya and Kenya.
The Rhodesian Front Party had been making serious
threats of U.D.I, since 1963, so the West knew what to ex
pect. When British Prime Minister Harold Wilson met Ian
Smith in Salisbury on October 29, 1965. he was kind enough
to inform Smith of the kind of sanctions that would be ap
plied against Rhodesia in the event of U.D.I. So Smith was
well prepared for sanctions if they came, whereas Britain
and the rest of the Western countries did not even have a
plan of implementation when U.D.I, was declared. Sanctions
were eventually implemented, slowly, voluntarily, and
selectively, with plenty of warning to the Smith regime.
Nor was there a time limit saying that if sanctions did not
work in two years, some other method would be used. No pro
visions were made for policing or enforcing sanctions.
Ian Smith declared U.D.I, for the purpose of maintaining
white supremacy in Rhodesia. Rhodesia under sanctions was
an embarrassment to the Western World. The principals of
democracy, which the Western World claims are the standard of
"civilized" governments, was openly flouted in Rhodesia.
The United States on March 17, 1970 cast its-first veto
at the United Nations-on a resolution that would have urged
the British government to use force to crush the rebellion
in Rhodesia and also to bring South Africa and Portugal to
7
comply with the international community by stopping their
sanction busting activities, with Smith's illegal regime,
the resolution also included severance of all communications
and transportation ties between Rhodesia and the outside
World.
Frederick S. Arkurst states that the relatively sub
stantial economic and military strength of the United States
in the contemporary world makes the development of American
policy, and the perception of such a policy, of vast impor
tance to every region of the world. American policy has a
considerable impact even on peripheral states that are not
major actors in world power politics, as these nations are
affected in a significant way by American attitudes on var
ious issues of international relations.
The Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned
African Scholars tries to shed some.light on how American
policy in Southern Africa is geared towards maintaining white
minority regimes, and, where this is not possible, creating
neo-colonial regimes that will maintain the dominance of the
white settlers in the economic sphere. The book states that
the issue in Southern Africa is not simply white minority
rule, although that rule is brutal and pervasive. What is
at stake is the political-economic structure which condemns
the Black majority of the region to. a life of grinding
poverty.
Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African
8
The Western powers, led by the United States, have pro
claimed their desire to help create "moderate" governments
throughout Southern Africa. They seek to avoid a fundamental
political-economic reconstruction-like that underway in Angola
and Mozambique-which alone could give Africans meaning access
to the rich resources of their nations. American policy
makers explicitly seek to "reconcile the Black desire for
political power-which the Blacks will get with the white de-
Q
sire for economic control...which they will retain.
Julius K. Nyerere, in an article states that:
The hostility aroused by the Smith Declaration of
Independence is based on rational interpretation
of its purpose and its effects in relation to the
total legitimate goals of Africa. For this re
bellion is notan uprising of the people, it re
presents an attempt to expand the area, and _
strengthen the hold in Africa of doctrines which
are inimical to the whole future of freedom in
this continent. It represents an advance by the
forces of racialism, fascism and indeed coloni
alism in Southern Africa. To the independent
States of Africa this is not a development which
can be viewed with Olympian detachment. We are
on the frontiers of the conflict with these
forces and our own future demands their defeat.
And while the forces of colonialism and racism
remain on this continent none of us can really
be free to live in peace and dignity, or be able
to concentrate on the purpose of our political
revolution. The Smith Declaration of Independ
ence presents a counterattack by these forces,
and it is in that context that Africa has re
acted and demanded its defeat.10
Scholars, U.S. Military Involvement In Southern Africa
(Boston: ' South End Press, 1978), PP- 4-5.
^Ibid., p. 5.
10Julius K. Nyerere, "Rhodesia in the Context of Southern
9
Furthermore, Nyerere states that Western governments
have declared their hostility to apartheid and their ad
herence to the principals of racial equality. They have
frequently made verbal declarations of their sympathy with
the forces in opposition to South African policies. But
they have excused their failure to act in support of their
words on the grounds of South African sovereignty. Africa
has shown a great deal of skepticism about this argument,
believing that it masked a reluctance to intervene on the
side of justice when white privilege is involved. Now, in
the case of Rhodesia, legality is on the side of interven
tion. What is the West going to do? Will it justify or con
found African fears.11 He stated also that the West had re
fused to challenge South Africa and Portugal to stop support
ing Ian Smith. The question of what to do if sanctions fail
to bring down the illegal Smith regime is not tackled.
Julius Nyerere concludes that despite legality and despite
the protestations of belief in human equality, the domina
tion of a white minority over blacks is acceptable to the
West.
It is my objective to conduct an analysis of American
reaction to United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia under
f:ur American administrations: from President Johnson
Africa," Foreign Affairs (April 1966), pp. 373-37^.
i:LIbid., p. 187.
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(1965) to Jimmy Carter (1977). This research will look at
policies of the various administrations from November 11,
1965 to December 1977. I am starting from November 11, 1965
due to the fact that this was the date that Mr. Smith de
clared Rhodesia independent, and I am stopping in December
1977, due to the fact that in early 1978 "moderate" African
leaders were brought into the Smith government as a means
to bringing about his own version of majority rule.
It is the objective of this research to look at the
years in which the legal regime in Rhodesia was dominated by
whites with no Black participation allowed in the franchise.
It is assumed by a number of people that these adminis
trations had policies that differed from each other. This
thesis seeks to examine this assumption and to determine if
in fact significant policy differences existed among the
administrations.
Immediately after Ian Smith declared U.D.I, mandatory
•economic sanctions were brought against the illegal regime
by the United Nations. The obstensible aim of these
economic sanctions was to topple the illegal government in
Rhodesia. During those 1^ years of sanctions it was clear
that many nations engaged in sanction-breaking, both legal
and illegal. This research also seeks to look at American
Multinational Corporations and to see how they failed to
comply with sanctions against the Smith regime.
The policies and priorities of the four administrations
toward corporations that violated United Nations sanctions
11
will also be examined.
In conducting this study my guiding hypothesis is that
since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence the United
States has consistently aimed at shoring up the minority re
gime and advancing the interests of United States capital




In the context of international relations, Johan
Galtung defines sanctions as "actions initiated "by one or
more international actors (the senders) against one or more
others (the receivers) with either or both of two purposes:
to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/
or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the
senders deem important."1 As Roger Fisher notes, "in
international conflict as elsewhere our first reaction to
somebody's doing something we don't like is to think of do
ing something unpleasant to them." Fisher goes on to note
that the purpose of sanctions is to exert influence on the
"receivers" to make some decisions; we want to cause them
2
to change their mind.
In the case of Rhodesia the United Nations applied
sanctions to bring down the minority regime and institute
majority rule.
Galtung further delineates sanctions according to their
1Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International # ^
Economic Sanctions With Examples From the Case of Rhodesia,





1. Negative or Positive
2. Individual or Collective
3« Internal or External
4. Unilateral, Multilateral or Universal
5. General or Selective
6. Total or Partial
He lists three broad inclusive types of sanctions:
A. Diplomatic Sanctions
1. Non-Recognition
2. Rupture of Diplomatic Relations
3. Non-co-operation by International Organizations
B. Communication Sanctions
1. Rupture of Telecommunications
2. Rupture of Mail Contact
3. Rupture of Transporation (Ship, Railroad, Air)
4. Rupture of News Communication (Radio, Newspaper,
Press Agencies)
5. Rupture of Personal Contact (Tourism Family
Visits)
C. Economic Sanctions
1. Rupture of Trade Relations (Economic Boycott)
a. Import boycott
b. Export boycott
In order for sanctions to be effective it is necessary
to determine the type of sanction to be used and concentrate
in that area. Thus vulnerability is the key and careful in
spection of the economy of the receiving nation is necessary
to determine what type of sanctions would have the greatest
impact without severely affecting the economy of the sender
nations. If the goal is to damage the economic system of
the receiving nation without similarly damaging the sending
nations, this can obviously be attained if a number of con-
(New York: Harper and Row, 1969)» PP- 2?-28,
ditions that Galtung refer to as "the ideal case for an
economic boycott" are fulfilled. The ideal conditions would
be more or less as follows:
1. that imports have a very high loading on important
sectors of the economy of the receiving nation;
2. that there is no internal substitute for imports;
3. that a high loading of the important imports comes
from the sending nation(s);
k. that there is no external substitute for these im
ports, so that the receiving nation cannot threaten
to change trade partners;
5. that the imports make up a very small part of the
exports of the sending nation(s), and/or that the
products can be exported to other nations;
6. that the exports from the receiving nation are sent
mainly to the sending nation(s), and that there
are no easy substitutes for them, so that the re
ceiving nation cannot obtain income easily;
7. that these exports from the receiving nation can
easily be obtained elsewhere by the sender(s) so
that the sending nation(s) are not hurt economi
cally and can threaten to change trade-partners,
or that the exports cannot be obtained elsewhere
by the sending nation(s) so that the sending
nation(s) can demonstrate that they would rather
suffer deprivation than touch products from the re
ceiving nation, and
8. that trade relations are easily supervised and even
controlled (as when the receiving nation is an is
land or is surrounded either by impenetrable terrain,
such as swamps or deserts, or by nations, that
participate in the boycott).3
The crucial concept here is vulnerability which has an
external and an internal component. The key to the under-
■^Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Eco
nomic Sanctions With Examples From the Case of Rhodesia,"
World Politics (April 17, 1967), P« 384.
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standing of vulnerability seems to be concentration the more
a country1s economy depends on one product, and the more its
exports consist of one product and the more its exports and
imports are concentrated on one trade-partner the more
vulnerable is the country. To launch economic sanctions
without a careful examination of all these factors would be
like launching a military campaign without military analysis.
Without going into a great many details, it is interest
ing to determine which countries rank highest in external
vulnerability. Among the first ten countries in the list
given in the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators
are four islands (Barbados, Mauritus, Cyprus and Malta) and
among the first ten countries in a similar list in the U.N.'s
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 196^ are three
islands, Mauritus, Trinidad, Iceland and Hong Kong, which
for all practical reasons is an island. The two ranking
lists are not identical, which reflects problems in connection
with national accounts statistics more so than changes be
tween the periods of time the two lists cover. However it
is interesting to note that six of the first seven countries
on the U.N. list are or have been under British rule. Also
the superpowers, the United States and the USSR, rank eight
ieth and eighty first on the World Handbook list which marks
them as particularly invulnerable. The Peoples Republic of
^Bruce M. Russet, World Handbook of Political And
Social Indicators (New Haven, 196*0, Table 46.
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China ranks seventy-ninth, France ranks sixty-seven, and the
United Kingdom, fifty-first. Clearly, the big powers are
very different from the smaller powers in external vulner
ability. A high score on this index means, low vulnerability
and a low score means high vulnerability. Rhodesia ranked
eight on the list of most vulnerable countries on the World
Handbook.
The determination of a nation's external vulnerability
reflects only some of the ideal conditions for economic boy
cott described earlier. There are still the problems of how
important the imports actually are, how easily internal or
external substitutes can be found, and so on. Imagine then
that, all external conditions listed above (conditions 3-8)
are obtained by extending the boycott from a unilateral
through a regional to a universal action. Then the receiv
ing nation is left with only three counterstrategies:
1. to train itself in sacrifice by doing without
certain commodities, and preferably even liking it;
2. to restructure the national economy so as to absorb
the shocK of the boycott, by producing locally the
imported commodities denied it or by making some
substitutes for them, by finding alternative
employment for people made jobless, and so forth;
and
3. to organize changes of trade with third parties,
5Ibid., p. 147-
6Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Eco-
Sanctions With Examples From the case of Rhodesia," World
Politics (April 19, 1967), P- 3«7-
17
or^via third parties,''7 or.if the boycott is truly
universal, to engage in smuggling.
To what extent these counterstrategies are sufficient
as defense will be discussed later, here it will be noted
that this repertory of defense measures is already quite
limited. On the other hand, the World has yet to see a uni
versal boycott.
The theory, of the effects of economic warfare is now
fairly similar to the theory of military warfare. Both
kinds of warfare are means toward the same end; disinte
gration of the enemy so that he gives up the pursuit of his
goals. The method used is value deprivation, which may or
may not increase with time according to how the action pro
ceeds and what countermeasures are enacted. Countermeasures
may take the form of offensive measures (value deprivation
from the attacker) or defensive measures (reducing the value
deprivation inflicted upon oneself) of active or passive
o
varieties.
Johan Galtung, distinguishes between a naive and a re
vised theory of the effects of economic warfare. The "naive"
theory of sanctions asserts a direct, positive correlation
'An excellent account of how South Africa was able to
get around the Idian boycott launched against it in July
1946 by means of trade via third parties is given in K.N.
Raj, "Sanctions and the Indian Experience," in Ronald Segel
ed., Sanctions Against South Africa (London 1964), pp. 197-
203.
8
Ibid., p. 3^8; See also Margaret P. Doxey, Economic
Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York: Oxford
18
between value deprivation and political disintegration.^
The idea is that there is a limit to how much value-depri
vation the system can stand and that once this limit is
reached (resulting in a split in leadership or between leader
ship and people), then political disintegration will proceed
very rapidly and will lead to surrender or willingness to
negotiate.
However this theory disregards the simple principle of
adaptation: that which seems unacceptable at the beginning
of the conflict becomes acceptable as one gets use to life
under hardship. This theory is referred to as "naive" al
so because it does not take into account the possibility
that value-deprivation may initially lead to political in
tegration and only later-perhaps much later, or even never-
to political disintegration.
T.R.C. Curtin and David Murray support the "naive"
theory of sanction and claim that this theory depends on the
potion that threatening peoples' incomes is as effective as
threating their lives and that, in the case of Rhodesia, a
decline in real income of the country's inhabitants should
lead either to the desired political changes or substantial
(white) emigration.
University Press, 1971)» p. 14.
°This must, have been a major theory behind many efforts
in recent history to bomb an adversary into submission.
10T.R.C. Curtin and David Murray, Economic Sanctions
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Far from provoking political change or disintegration,
sanctions may well do precisely the opposite-namely, enhance
the solidarity, cohesion, and popular support of the target.
The generalized siege mentality induced "by sanctions may
make dissidents or potential dissidents more suspect to
appeals for national unity. Wallerstein indicates that
"the theory that economic sanctions would "be an act of sup
port for the opposing groups in the receiver is not vali
dated."12
After studying the sanctions against Italy in 1935 and
in 1936, George W. Baer concludes "What was meant to be
only instrumental economic pressure to elicit internal pro
test was transformed by the Italian government into a cause
for rapid intensification of integral economic and political
nationalism.13 According to Doxey, "a siege psychosis, once
engendered, can be a powerful factor in sustaining the will
to resist, and it will also enable the government to take
and Rhodesia (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1967)»
p. 12.
^Harry Strack, Sanctions; The Case of Rhodesia
(Syracuse University Press, 1978), p. 14.
12Peter Wallerstein, "Characteristics of Economic
Sanctions," in A Multi-Method Introduction to International
Politics, ed. William D. Coplin and C.W. Kegley (Chicago:
Markham, 1971) 1 P« 143.
13George W. Baer, "Sanctions and Security: The League
of Nations and the Italisn-Ethiopian War,, 1935-1936," In^
ternational Organization 2? (Spring 1973), p. 179-
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unpopular steps such as rationing consumer goods or increas
ing taxes."
There are three conditions under which the revised
theory is more valid than the naive theory, such conditions
include:
1. The attack from the outside is seen as an attack
as a whole, not on only a fraction of it;
2. There is very weak identification with the attacker,
preferably even negative identification; and
3. There is belief in the value of one's own goals in
the sense that no alternative is seen as better?1^
The interesting thing is that in economic warfare, often
even more than in military warfare, the first condition is
almost immediately and automatically satisfied. The collec
tive nature of economic sanctions makes them hit the inno
cent along with the guilty. They are in practice, if not in
theory, an application of the principle of collective
guilty. However, if the other two conditions are not
satisfied, then this may turn to the benefit of the attacker.
B
Internal dissension in the receiving nation may result when
the people feel harassed. The people may then bring pressure
14-
Margaret P. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International
Enforcement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971)» p. 26.
-'johan Galtung, "On the Effects of Inter, -..zional Eco
nomic Sanctions With Examples From the Case of "-hodesia,"
World Politics (April 19, 196?), p. 389.
During the Nigerian Civil War when the federal Govern
ment of Nigeria, imposed an economic blockade on then Biafra,
it affected both the minorities and the people responsible for
the Biafran secession, the people responsible for the secession.
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upon the leaders to change their policy-in other words
political disintegration.
Defense Against Economic Sanctions
Two principles for discussing counterstrategies against
economic sanctions have been presented. One of them follows
from the logic of the attacker. There are three holes in
this system, however, even when sanctions are universal
(adaptation to sacrifices, restructuring the economy to ab
sorb the shock, and smuggling). The other principles follows
from the logic behind what Galtung called the revised theory
(that the collectivity is threatened, that there is no
identification with the attacker, and that there is firm
belief in one's own values).
The details about how the first three counterstrategies
work out in the Rhodesian case are in a sense obvious as
pects of the total situation. More important is the ques-^
tion the social scientist observing the situation will im-
mediately ask: Are these strategies self-reinforcing so
that some immediate benefit or reward can be derived from
engaging in them, and so that one does not have to rely on
belief in ultimate victory or loyalty to the regime alone?
The following accounts seem to indicate that this is the
case for all three.
Q: How do you manage with so little petrol?
A: Oh, that is easy enough. You know, if a family
has two cars and receives some petrol for both,
to put one car in the garage is not very much of
22
a sacrifice. Because some of us who live in the
countryside and have offices in Salisbury join
our nations and form a car pool and go in together.
It is strange to see how much better friends one
becomes with ones neighbours in such a situation,
we really did not know them before. An if even
this should not work, this may be the great impetus
that forces the city to develop adequate collective
transportation, and if even that does not work,
doctors are almost unanimous that working is good
for you.1?
Thus an important mechanism increasing group solidarity is
revealed. The car pool seems to have some of the same
functions as the bomb shelter during an air raid.18 Adap
tive measures have become goals in themselves.
Let us now turn to the possible consequences of re
structuring the economy. People in key economic positions
are also usually people with political influence. An eco
nomic boycott may reshuffle the relative importance of eco
nomic sectors so that new economic elites emerge. The ques
tion is, will the new elites be more or less willing to com
ply with the norms of the sending nations? Since economic
boycott in general implies a rapid decrease or import-export
business and a change toward home-based production, the ques
tion is whether the cosmopolitan layer of the tertiary sector
(engaged in trade), which stands to lose some of its signif
icance, is more or less amenable to compliance than are the
17
Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Eco
nomic Sanctions With Examples From the Case of Rhodesia,"
World Politics (April 19, I967), p. 39^-.
18
A good account of the effects of air raids on Britain
is found in R.M. Titmuss, "Argument of Strain," in Eric and
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emerging leaders of home-based industry or agriculture (or
other primary activities). In the Rhodesian case, the
farmers are seen as the group most solidly behind Smitti .
Mary Josephson, eds. Man Alone (New York: 1962), pp. 505-
515.
CHAPTER II
U.S. REACTION TO U.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST
RHODESIA: THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
When Ian Smith declared U.D.I., President Johnson on
that same day was having a full scale foreign policy review
with his senior advisers at his ranch. Secretaries Dean
Rusk, Robert McNamara, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt
Rostow, then the chairman of the State Department's Policy
Planning Council, were in Texas when the African Bureau of
State began to consider the appropriate American response to
the news of U.D.I. A telephone call was reportedly placed
from the Bureau to Rusk. His reaction was cautious.
Speaking to the press after the policy review, Rusk said
that the American government deplored the "unilateral action
of the white minority government of Rhodesia in illegally
seizing power."2 The United States, he said, would recall
its Consul General in Rhodesia and terminate the activities
of the United States Information Services there. Further
sanctions would be withheld, however, until Ambassador
Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (Columbia University
Press, 1976), p. 80.
2
Ibid., p. 81. See also United States Department of
State Bulletin, December, 1965, p. 908.
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Goldberg stated the full American position on Rhodesia at
the United Nations the following day and "We see what Britain
does."^
Rusk*s statement suggested that American policy on
Southern Rhodesia would remain within the old parameters.
The State Department, would not get out in front of the
British but would make the gestures necessary to keep the
Africans and others from singling out the United States for
particular pressure on the issue.
By the day following U.D.I., however, decisions as to
the first full response of the United States had been made,
and Ambassador Goldberg announced at the United Nations a
series of American measures: A comprehensive embargo was
being placed on the shipment of all arms and military equip
ment to Rhodesia; American private travel to Rhodesia was
discouraged; Americans were advised they could no longer be
required to have British not Rhodesia, visas; U.S. quotas
for the importation of Rhodesia sugar were suspended; action
on all applications for U.S. government loans and credit and
investment guarantees to Rhodesia was suspended, and diplo
matic status was withdrawn from the minister for Rhodesian
Affairs in the British embassy in Washington and from his
staff.^




After Ian Smith declared independence, reaction was
swift at the United Nations Headquarters. At an emergency
meeting on November 11, 1965, the Assembly condemned the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence by a vote of 10? to 2
(Portugal and South Africa) with one abstention (France).
The Assembly asked the United Kingdom to implement the pre
vious resolution "in order to put an end to the rebellion by
the unlawful authorities in Rhodesia," and it recommended
that the Security Council consider the situation as very ur
gent . *
On November 20, 1965, the Security Council passed
Resolution 217 condemning U.D.I, and called upon the United
Kingdom to quell the rebellion. It also called upon all
states to neither recognize the Smith regime nor to enter
tain any diplomatic or other relations with it; to provide
it with no arms or other military equipment, to do their ut
most to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia,
and to include in these, efforts an embargo on oil and petro
leum products. The Resolution represented a compromise be
tween drafts submitted by the British and 36 African states.
The African draft would have imposed an oil embargo instead
of asking member states to cut oil exports of Southern
Rhodesia. It would also have included a provision for em
ploying "all enforcement measures," which implied the use of
?United Nations Document. A/Resolution/2024 (xx).
2?
force. Ambassador Goldberg played a key role in finding the
compromise that helped the British avoid casting a veto.
Goldberg, who had been ill with a virus infection and did
not participate in the negotiations over the draft resolution
until the very last stages, suggested a key amendment to the
African draft. The draft had stated that "the situation con
stituted a threat to international peace and security."
Such a finding by the Security Council would have opened the
way to the use of force or mandatory sanctions. Goldberg
suggested rephrasing the statement to read that "the situation
...is of extreme seriousness...its continuance in time con-
n
stitutes a threat to international peace and security."'
The phrase "its continuance in time" allowed the British to
interpret the resolution as calling for the possible appli
cation of Article 33. This section of the charter provides
that in any situation "the continuation of which" is likely
to endanger peace and security, efforts be made to find a
solution by negotiations and other peaceful means. The
Africans, on the other hand, interpreted Goldberg's phrase
to mean that, if the situation persisted, the Security
Council would reopen discussion of the question of further
sanctions or even force. Calculated and precise ambiguity
often lies at the heart of successful diplomacy. Ambassador
Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (Columbia University
Press, 1976), p. 86.
7Ibid., p. 86.
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Golberg's intervention was a model of its kind. Adding a
rhetorical bouquet to the diplomatic assistance he had given
the British as they wriggled away from the veto, Goldbergfs
statement on the resolution praised the "galant" and pro-
digous efforts made by Prime Minister Wilson to bring the
o
rebellion to an end. The Africans were dissapointed, but
U.D.I, had at least made the British agree that the Security
Council should be involved in the Rhodesian question. And
immediately after the vote on Resolution 217, Ambassador
Goldberg provided a small sweetner. He announced that the
United States would do more than cancel the 1966 quota for
sugar imports from Rhodesia.^ It had since been learned he
said, that "the entire 1,905 sugar quota, amounting to ap
proximately 9,500 tons is now on the high seas in transit to
the United States." The President had ordered the suspension
of the sugar quota for 1965 as well, and had directed that,
Shipment from Rhodesia would not be accepted.*1"
But these few American measures, and the measures taken
by the British, were clearly not enough, the African group
wanted a commitment and an inclusion in Resolution 217 for
force to be used to bring down the illegal regime in Southern
Rhodesia but the British and the Americans were not willing
o
United States Department of State Bulletin, December
6, 1965, P. 913.
9Ibid., p. 914.
Ibid., p. 915. See also Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby"
Option (Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 86-87.
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to support them. Speaking at a meeting of the State Depart
ment American Legion Post, Assistant Secretary G.M. Williams
emphasized the readiness of the United States to support
further economic measures by British against the Rhodesian
regime, and noted that the British had already applied a
"broad range" of sanctions. Then he went further "speed is
a critical factor in the situation," however, he added:
African nations already are impatient with
Britain's choice of measures. Many of them
are pressing for direct military action.
And a few would consider turning to the com
munist for help on the ground that the West
is not moving fast enough. Obviously, the
Communists would be happy to rush into this
situation if they get a chance.-*-1
Despite all these beautiful speeches no American official
suggested or encouraged the British to use force, whereas
12
in other situations force was used.
In May 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made
a major policy address in Montreal, Canada where he said
"the United States has no mandate on high to police the world
Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (Columbia University
Press, 1976), pp. 88-81^ "
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In November 2^-26, 196^, American and Belgian armed
forces carried out an airborn "rescue" of several hundred
white hostages being held by rebel forces in Stanleyville.
The impact of the operation was that it helped persuade
Johnson that the U.S. should avoid future "Stanleyville's"
anywhere in Africa, including Southern Rhodesia; yet in
retrospect to the African, it was proof that Europe and
America would intervene against black rebels in the Congo
but would flinch from military confrontation with white
rebels like Ian Smith. (See Waldemar Nelson, The Great
Powers And Africa (New York: Praeger Books, I969), p. 308.
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and no inclination to do so. There have been classic cases
in which our deliberate nonaction was the wisest action of
13
all." J To Africans, by then ardently pressing Great Britain
to use force in disposing of the illegal Rhodesian regime,
McNamara's statement not only seemed a transparently veiled
promise of the administration to congressional critics not
to embark on intervention again, as in Vietnam, but it was
also read as a clue that in the unlikely event Britain might
employ military measures in Southern Rhodesia,, the United
States would not join.
American support for the British against African attacks
and pressure on the British to take firmer action against the
rebels in Rhodesia was balanced by the general rhetoric of
American leaders on the Southern Rhodesian question. On
May 26, 1966, President Johnson invited a group of African
Ambassadors to the White House to observe the third anniver
sary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity.
•In the first major speech by an American President devoted
exclusively to African questions Johnson said:
As a basic part of our national tradition we
support self determination and an orderly
transition to majority rule in every corner
of the globe. These principles have guided
American policy from India to the Philippines
from Vietnam to Pakistan. They guide our
policy today toward Rhodesia. We are giving
every encouragement and support to the efforts
of the United Kingdom and the United Nations
^Waldemar A. Nelsen, The Great Powers and Africa (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1969). PP« 313-TOT ~
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to restore legitimate government in Rhodesia.
Only when this is accomplished can steps be
taken to open full power and responsibility
of Nationhood to the people of Rhodesia-
not just six percent of them. I**
But the President did not commit himself to any new, specific
action on the issue.
Due to the rhetorical support by the United States and
pressure from the African's British Prime Minister Harold
Wilson announced at the Commonwealth Conference in Lagos in
January 1966, that on the basis of "expert advice available
to him the cumulative effects of the economic and financial
sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a
matter of weeks rather than months."
In December 1966, Arthur Goldberg said that due to
violations of human rights the situation in Rhodesia was a
threat to international peace.1 It was this designation of
the situation in Southern Rhodesia as one of "world concern,"
but of the violations of human rights, that enabled the
Western Nations to justify in December 1966, their acceptance
of the British proposition that the situation in Southern
Rhodesia had become "a threat to international peace and
security." It was a justification that was necessary in or-
lZfRelease by the House Subcommittee On Africa," U.S.
Policy in Rhodesia, Friday October 1?, 1969, pp. 12-13.
^Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, Final
Communique, Lagos, Nigeria, January 1966, CMND 2890.
• l6Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (Columbia University
Press, 1976), p. 101.
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der to invoke mandatory economic sanctions against Southern
Rhodesia. Thus on December 16, 1966, the Security Council
passed Resolution 232 and for the first time in U.N. history
imposed mandatory economic sanctions. '
Under this resolution, the Council prohibited importation
of the following Rhodesian commodities: asbestos, iron-ore,
chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat pro
ducts, and hides, skins and leather. Also banned was the
export to Rhodesia of oil or oil products, arms and military
18
equipment, aircraft and motor vehicles. Unlike other
United Nations resolutions which merely "requested" or
"urged" action by Governments, the terms of resolution 232
(1966) demanded compliance. The council, the resolution
stated, "decides that all members of the United Nations
shall prevent" the import of the listed commodities. To
emphasize the mandatory nature of its action, the Council re
minded all United Nations members that failure or refusal to
carry out the sanctions would violate Article 25 of the
Charter, which states* "The members of the United Nations
agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
19
Council in accordance with the present Charter." 7 The next
step for American officials was to issue an Executive Order
17Ibid., p. 101.
1 p
See Appendix I (for full text of U.N. restrictions
216) State Department Bulletin, January 9, 196?, pp. 77-78,
^ Appendix II (on full text of Resolution 232).
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implementing the sanctions. This was left to the Treasury
and Commerce Department and the Office of the Legal Adviser
in the State Department. There was little argument among
agencies or bureaus over the text of the order, which listed
the various prohibited activities and assigned responsibility
for implementation of the American sanctions program among
the Secretaries of State, Commerce and Treasury. The only
controversy came when the order was issued on January 5i
1967. The White House press release, apparently drafted in
the Treasury Department and not widely cleared within the
State Department,20 announced that implementing regulations
would be issued by the Departments shortly, and would be
effective as of the date of the Executive Order. The news
release then stated: "A violation of an executive order is
a criminal offense. Provision will be made in the regulations
to deal with cases of undue hardship arising from trans
actions commenced before the date of the Order."21 A similar
reference to a hardship exception was contained in the sub
sequent Treasury Department press release that accompanied
the Department's sanctions regulations. A hardship ex
ception was not mentioned anywhere in the Executi Order.
Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (Columbia University
Press, 1976), pp. 287-289.
20
Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (Columbia Univer
sity Press), pp. 101-102.
21Ibid. pp. 295-297. Appendix II (See full text of
Executive Order 11322).
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But this ex-post facto definition of such an exception was
to become the basis for claims by Union Carbide and the Foote
Mineral Company of the right to import certain allotment of
Southern Rhodesia chrome. Union Carbide was to claim that
it had paid for approximately 150,000 tons of chrome after
passage of the U.N. resolution but before the issuance of the
Executive Order, and that it would be a hardship on the com-
22
pany not to be allowed to import the chrome it had purchased.
After selective mandatory sanctions did not topple the
Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia, the Security Council,
convened on March 19, 1968 at the request of 36 African states,
heard a number of statements deploring the executions of
Africans in Southern Rhodesia, and calling for more effective
action against the regime.2-^ Algeria, Ethiopia, India,
Pakistan and Senegal proposed in the draft resolution that
the Council call upon all states to.sever all relations with
the regime, censure Protugal and South Africa for their
assistance to Southern Rhodesia in defiance of the Security
Council, decide to take action against Portugal and South
Africa if they persisted in defying council decisions, and
urge the United Kingdom to take all necessary measures in-
eluding the use of force to end the rebellion. ^ The African
group also emphasized the need to cut consular and trade re-
22Ibid., p. 102.
23Ibid., p. 46.
Office of Public Information, A Principle In Torment;
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presentation in Southern Rhodesia, in fact to terminate all
communications with the rebel colony. Britain and the United
States demurred, the former because as administering author
ity it wished to keep open a channel for communication with
Southern Rhodesia and the United States because the require
ment to interdict communications would have raised serious
constitutional problems. D Britain submitted a draft re
solution calling for comprehensive mandatory sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia, affecting all trade and economic
relations, to augment the selective actions imposed in
December 1966. After consultation among Council members a
new draft resolution emerged, and was adopted unanimously on
May 29, I968. Under this measure, resolution 253 (1968),
the Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter-decided that all member states "Shall Prevent:"
The import of all commodities and products originating
in Southern Rhodesia;
Any activities by their nationals or in their terri
tories which would promote the export of any com
modities or products from Southern Rhodesia, and any
dealings by their nationals or in their territories
in any such products, including in particular transfer
of funds for the purpose of such activities;
The shipment in their vessels or aircraft of any
Southern Rhodesian commodities or products to any
person or body in Rhodesia or to any other person or
body for the purposes of any business operated from
Rhodesia (except for medical and educational material,
publications, new materials, and in special humani-




The shipment in their vessels or aircrafts or the trans
port across their territories of any commodities con
signed to Southern Rhodesia; The provision of any funds
for investment or any other financial or economic re
sources, or the remitting of any funds except pension
payments or funds for strictly medical, humanitarian
or educational purposes and in special humanitarian
circumstances, foodstuffs.
The entry into their territories, save on exceptional
humanitarian groups, of any person traveling on a
Southern Rhodesian passport or any person ordinarily
resident in Southern Rhodesia, believed to have en
couraged the unlawful actions of the illegal regimest^
operations by airlines to or from Southern Rhodesia.
The United States supported this British resolution and
on May 29, 1968 President Johnson issued Executive Order
Despite these executive orders and U.S. support for
sanctions at the United Nations, the Treasury and Commerce
Departments reportedly were not in favor of United Nations
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Treasury officials are
said to have argued that a sanctions program against Southern
•Rhodesia could not prove successful and would damage the con
cept of sanctions. This could, in turn interfere with Treas
ury's sanctions program against Albania, Cuba, the Peoples
Republic of China and other communist nations. Treasury was
also concerned about the effect on the American balance of
2.6
See Appendix III for full text of Resolutions 253
(1968). Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (Columbia
University Press, 1976), 'pp. 289-294-.
27See full text of Executive Order 11419 (May 29, 1968),
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payments and gold position if American relations with South
Africa became involved. The CIA, like the Treasury, doubted
28
that sanctions would succeed.
The Undersecretary of State George Ball believed that
liberalization of the societies of Southern Africa depended
on economic development, and ridiculed the concept of eco
nomic sanctions. As he was to write later in his book, The
Discipline of Power;
Rhodesia is now caught in the movement of swiftly
paced history and there is little that I can use
fully say about it at this time, other than to ex
press the feeling-which I have long felt-that eco
nomic sanctions are, in the modern day, a romantic
delusion-a wishful expression of man's hope to
find some means, short of direct military force,
to compel nations and people to take the desired
•military force to compel nations and peoples to
take the desired political decisions....Where
military power is not employed and the enforce
ment of an embargo depends merely on the agree
ment of nations-whether or not expressed in a
United Nations resolution-the result will more
likely be annoyance than hardship.^9
Appendix IV. Ibid., pp. 298-300.
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9George Ball, The Discipline of Power (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1968), p. ^
CHAPTER III
U.S. REACTION TO U.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST
RHODESIA: THE KISSINGER PERIOD
In a pre-election interview in 1972, former President
Nixon said:
I wouldn't want to leave the impression that....
Africa will not get attention...(it) will, be
cause none of our present policies are sacred
cows. I am going to look at the African policy
to see how our programs can be improved in those
areas.1
The "improvements" made under the Nixon administration
are indicative of the direction of United States policy
toward Southern Africa.
The United States voted to support sanctions, and
various executive orders made it unlawful for anyone in the
United States to trade with Rhodesia. The penalties were
severe and on paper it seemed that the United States was
committed to implementing sanctions. In practice However
the United States has been second only to South Africa in
Sanction-busting. The reason is to be found in the secret
2
I969 National Security Study Memorandum 39.
Bruce Oudes, "Sacred Cows And Silverlinings," Africa
Report (November-December 1972),_p. 9-
2Mohammed El-Kawas and Barry Cohen, "The Kissinger Study
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In April I969, Dr. Henry Kissinger directed the preparation
of a comprehensive review of United States policy toward
Southern Africa by the National Security Council Inter
departmental Group for Africa-composed primarily of represent
atives of the State Department, the Department of Defense
and the Central Intelligence Agency. Treasury, Commerce,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Aid for International Development and
NASA-added their special knowledge. The emphasis was to "be
on broadening the range of views and presenting alternative
policies.
The Kissinger policy toward Southern Africa formally
enunciated after the completion of NSSM 39» favoured the
"maintenance of the status quo in Southern Africa to whatever
extent possible."-^
Kissinger's policy recommendations derived from three
NSSM assumptions:
1. If violence in the area escalated, U.S. interest
will be threatened.
2. The whites are here to stay and the only way that
constructive change can come about is through them.
3- There is no hope for blacks to gain political rights
they seek through violence, which will only lead to
chaos and increased opportunities for the communists.
of Southern Africa," NSSM 39 (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Co.,
1976).
3
-'Mohammed El-Kawas and Barry Cohen, "The Kissinger Study
of Southern Africa," NSSM'39 (Westport: Lawrence Hill and
Co., 1976), p. 105.
^id., p. 28.
Kissinger's immediate concern .revolved around preventing
open war in Southern Africa, like that of Vietnam, that might
happen at a time when the enormous outlays of money, equip
ment and personnel for the Indochina war left little time,
energy or money for other problems.
The new policy was to be based on "communications,"
United Nations rhetoric and voting patterns which detracted
from "communications,"vfaich the white ruled states were to
be minimized. In accordance with this new policy, American
officials were instructed to limit any criticisms they might
have of white minority regimes and to virtually remain silent
on racial and colonial conflicts in the area of Southern
Africa. Instructions such as these issued in January of 1970
"...marked the beginning of the new Nixon-Kissinger policy
of Communication and a departure from the Johnson policies,
which had been designed to maintain some kind of credibility
with African leaders."-'
The Nixon-Kissinger policy was directed toward .con
structing links with the racist white Rhodesian government.
Option Two of NSSM 39, which laid the basis for Richard'
Nixon's policy toward Southern Africa, states that the United
States should "be more flexible in its attitude towards the
Smith regime" and specifically states that the United States
should "gradually relax sanctions." Kissinger's letter to
President Nixon in January, 1970, states: "Recommendation
5Ibid., p. 25..
...that State, Treasury and Commerce begin to formulate for
your consideration, alternative approaches concerning United
States participation in Sanctions if other nations continue
to relax."
The purpose of such a policy therefore became an attempt
to balance United States economic, strategic and scientific
interest in Rhodesia with the political affect of dissocia
ting the United States from the White minority regime and
their stiffling racial tactics. The result of such a position,
(a) led to increased contact with minority regimes at the
cost of decreased access for African diplomats and leaders
...(b) a policy that would remain unchanged so long as the
Soviet Union and China made no attempts to extend their
sphere of influence in Southern Africa-a move that would not
be tolerated by the Nixon administration...(c) rejection of
the concept (by the U.S.) of one man one vote (majority rule)'
and its consequences.'
By the autumn of 1971, this new policy of "communica
tion" was receiving strong support from the State Department.
In September 1971, a speech by Assistant Secretary Newsom
stated-in very strong terms-the reasoning behind "communica
tion." "Isolation can breed resistance to change. Open
doors can accelerate it."
Edgar Lockwood, Issues, No. 3 (Fall 1974), p. 73.
'Mohammed El-Kawas and B. Cohen, "The Kissinger Study of •
Southern Africa," NSSM 39 (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Co.,
Indeed, in his flat prediction that "economic and de
mographic pressures" made change in South Africa "inevitable,"
Newsom was expressing a certainty which went beyond the
strong hopes of the framers of "tar baby (Option Two)."
Terrenee Smith's article of April 2, 1972 in The New
York Times provided the first public description in the
United States of the relationship between a series of
practical steps taken by the administration toward closer re
lations with the white minority regimes and the fact that a
fundamental shift in approach had- taken place more than two
years earlier. These steps, not all of which were directly
related to the policy review, included a redefinition of
embargoes on military equipment for Portugal and South Africa,
which permitted the sale of two Boeing 707 Airliners to the
Portuguese and the authorization for sale of executive jet
aircraft to South African military (ironically, after the
administration had made this gesture, the South Africans
failed to purchase any .of these aircraft); a new agreement
with the Portuguese government on American bases in the
Azores and authority for the Export-Import Bank to loan
Portugal up to $4-00 million; a new agreement covering the
sale of South African gold to the International Monetary Fund
on terms highly favourable to Pretoria; and a series of ab-
1976), p. 30.
o
Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (Columbia Univer
sity Press, 1976), p. 133.
stentidn and negative votes at the United Nations on measures
condemning apartheid and white regimes of Southern Africa."
The impact of the American policy of "Communications"
on Rhodesia's white minority government can be seen through
the examination of three issues, the maintenance of the
American Consulate in Rhodesia, American votes at the United
Nations and the granting of an exception to the sanctions
requested by the Union Carbide Corporation.
The American Consulate In Rhodesia
On June 27, 1969, Roger P. Morris who was responsible
for African Affairs in the National Security Council Staff
met with Kenneth Towsey, the head of the Rhodesian Informa
tion Office in Washington. The meeting had been arranged by
John Jordi of the South African Press. Jordi had previously
complained to Morris that American officials lacked any real
communication with the Rhodesians in Washington and that this
was a mistake.10 And since the NSSM 39 policy review stressed
.communications with white minority regimes in Southern Africa,
the meeting was held.
This meeting brought Morris to the question of the
American Consulate in Salisbury. On June 20, 19^9. the
Rhodesian white electorate voted overwhelmingly that Rhodesia
should become a Republic. While Smith had not yet declared
o
^Terrence Smith, New York Times, April 2, 1972.
Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (Columbia Univer
sity Press, 1976), p. 4
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the Republic, Rhodesia's final break with Britain was assured.
On June 24, 1969 London withdrew its residual mission in
Salisbury. This raised, of course, the question of the
continued status of the American Consulate there. Its re
moval or retention would'make little actual difference, but
it was a symbol of American policy to the Rhodesians the
British and others. The continued presence of the Consulate
would affirm a continuing American interest in events within
Rhodesia; it would also imply American unwillingness to ac
cept Britain's complete jurisdiction over Rhodesian Affairs.
Morris saw Towsey again in August, and then in October
at a party given by Jordi. Towsey reportedly said that his
government would not raise the issue of the legal status of
the Consulate. The United States government was welcome to
stay there as long as it wished. Even as a Republic, Rhodesia
would not insist that the Consulate be accredited to it. The
United States could maintain the "fiction" of accreditation
to the British or even to the Matabele Kingdom, if it
12
wished. The important thing is that some contact was main
tained. Morris reportedly informed Kissinger and the President
of these conversations, suggesting that the Rhodesians were
not going to push the United States Consulate out of Salisbury
but that at some point the legal issue would probably arise
with Britain.13




U.S. Consul General Paul O'Neill returned to Salisbury
in Mid-September 1969, after a home leave in the United
States. According to a story by R.W. Apple, Jr. in the New
York Times, many Rhodesians rejoiced at his return. One
Official privately told a visiting American, "I can't think
of anything that would have been a better morale booster for
us at the moment." O'Neill who himself had recommended the
closure of the Consulate, had become a symbol for white
Rhodesians of their importance to the United States.
Another Rhodesian official was quoted by Apple as saying: "I
know some people in the world would like to pretend that we
don't exist, but as you can see, we do exist, and no amount
of bullying will make us cease to exist."
The "tar baby" Option included a decision to retain the
Consulate and even to move eventually to recognition of the
Smith government; the State Department wanted to close the
Consulate. The President's decision was a compromise: no
'immediate action would be taken. ■*
In Mid-January of 1970 prompted by the Sanction Com
mittee, Secretary-General U Thant sent letters to the govern
ments still maintaining Consular and other representation in
Salisbury, asking them in effect to pull out.
lZ*R.W. Apple, New York Times, September 21, 1969.
^Congressional Digest, February 1973. PP« 33-64.
^Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby'" Option (Columbia University
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 253 of
May, 1968, which had ordered comprehensive mandatory
sanctions against Rhodesia had recommended that all Consular
and trade representation in Rhodesia be terminated.
At midnight, March 1-2, 1970, Ian Smith formally de
clared Rhodesia a Republic. Yet the American position on
the Consulate did not change. The State Department Spokes
man said that the matter was "Still under active considera
tion." Secretary Rogers, who had returned from Africa in
late February and had submitted another memorandum to the
President urging the Consulate's withdrawal.
In London, British officials at the working level raised
the issue with the American embassy, referring to the fact
that it was the British and not the Rhodesians who had pro
vided the Consulate with its exequatur. The White House would
17
not move.
In the end, the British dislodge the administration
from its position. On March 5» 1970, foreign and common
wealth Secretary Michael Stewart called Ambassador Anneberg
to the foreign office to discuss the situation. Stewart gave
Anneberg a formal, clear message. If the United States did
not withdraw the Consulate, the British would in the very
near future, consider withdrawing the exequatur. Similar
Press, 1976), p. 139.
17
'Ibid., p. 14-2. See also Hearings of Subcommittee On
Africa, October 17, 1969.
messages were being passed to the o.ther nations which re
tained representation in Salisbury faced with an open break
with the British, the President gave in. On March 9,
Secretary Rogers happily announced that the Consulate would
be closed on March 17.
One week after the Consulate was closed Robert Good, who
had left the State Department and was then a Professor at
John Hopkins University, told the House Subcommittee on
Africa:
The 1970s in Africa Mr. Nixon asserts, will be
years of hard choice. Evidently he is right.
He equivocated for eight months over the de
cision to close our Consulate in Rhodesia when
it was an open secret that his Secretary of
State strongly advised that it be closed and a
.patent fact that the British urged its closure.
If Mr. Nixon found in that issue a hard choice,
one can only wonder how he will respond should
the going get rough in Southern Africa.18
America Breaks Its Virginity At The U.N.
On March 17, 1970, the day that Consul O'Neill left
Salisbury the United States cast its first veto at the United
Nations-on a resolution concerning Rhodesia. While it was
an accident that the two events occured on the same day,
they symbolized the administrations intention to give in no
more on Rhodesia.
With Smith's declaration of a Republic at the beginning
of the month, African delegations at the United Nations had
18
Testimony by Robert C. Good before the House Sub
committee on Africa, March 2^-, .1970.
"begun to urge again that the British use force to crush the
rebellion. A tough resolution along these lines was drafted;
it also included the mandatory withdrawal of foreign Con
sulates in Salisbury. On March 6, the British introduced
their own resolution, designed once again to finesse the
Africans, which called on all countries to neither recognize
the Rhodesian Republican regime nor to give it any assist
ance. The Africans with their Asian allies, went ahead with
their draft. As presented to the Security Council, it ex
tended sanctions to Portugal and South Africa, condemned the
British for their refusal to use force, and called for the
severance of all communications and transportation ties be
tween Rhodesia and the outside world. The British and the
American delegations at first thought that no veto would be
necessary, since it appeared that the draft resolution would
have only eight affirmative votes, one short of the necessary
majority.^ But the drafts' sponsors gained Spain's support.
No longer inhibited by loyalty to its neighbor, Spain agreed
to vote against the British. In doing so, they apparently
calculated that, that would both improve their relations with
the Afro-Asians world and pick up support for their position
against the British on Gilbraltar.
The Spanish defection meant that a veto would be neces
sary to defeat the Afro-Asian draft .resolution. The State
19Department of State Bulletin, April 13, 1970, pp. 501-
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Department which had supported removal of the Consulate and
had opposed "tar baby" felt that it was time that the United
States come out from behind Britain's skirts and show the
Africans at the United Nations that the use of force, the
extention of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal, and the
severance of the communications links to Rhodesia were
simply not in the cards. Both the African Bureau and the
Bureau of International Organization Affairs reportedly
agreed, therefore that the United States should join the
British in their expected veto. -As is customary on major
U.S. votes in the United Nations, the final decision was
left to the White House, the American Ambassador received a
phone call from the White House telling him to cast a U.S.
veto.20
Thus American Ambassador to the U.N. Mr. Yost and Lord
Caradon, the British representative, joined in killing the
measure. The American veto was thus unnecessary; but it
probably would have been cast even if American officials had
known all along that the British would act as they did. The
United States cast its veto at the United Nations it seems
out of choice rather than necessity.
By mid-1973, the United States had vetoed four more
measures in the Security Council. The fourth again concerned
Rhodesia and again the United States acted with the British.
20
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They struck down a draft resolution which would have limited
the purchase by all states of any products from South Africa
and the Protuguese territories to the quantitative levels
prevailing in 1965 and would have extended the Beira block
ade to cover the commodities and products travelling between
Rhodesia and the Port of Laurenco Marques. The draft re
solution would also have had the Council urge the British to
implement fully the extension of the blockade and sought the
cooperation of other states in doing so. The United States
decided to veto this resolution. And, explaining on May 22
why the United States was joining in the veto of this measure,
Ambassador John Scali said,
While we can well understand the sentiment behind
the draft resolution, we consider it unrealistic
to call for broader sanctions until the full
membership of the United Nations has demonstrated
its willingness to take more-, seriously the
sanctions already in force.
Union Carbide Breaks Sanctions Officially
Union Carbide, Foote Mineral and Corning Glass applied
for exceptions under the terms of the "hardship" provision
of the press release accompanying the President's Executive
Order of January 1967, and a Treasury Department press re
lease of March 1, I967. The Treasury release had stated that,
"in general," Rhodesian goods which had been paid for but not
exported before January 5» 19^7» would be licensed for im
port into the United States, if it were a case of "undue
21Ibid., p.
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hardship." Corning Glass's application for license to im
port petalite clearly did not meet this criterion. Foote
Minerals' request was also not accepted.
Union Carbide in November and mid-December, 1966, had
transferred approximately $3 million to a South African
subsidiary Ruighoek Chrome Mines. On December 21, five days
after the United Nations had passed its mandatory embargo
against Rhodesian Chrome, Ruighoek sent $2,680,000 to another
Union Carbide subsidiary, Rhodesian Chrome Mines, as payment
??
for 150,000 tons of chromite. Union Carbide officials
claim that some of these 150,000 tons would have been im
ported before the mandatory sanctions had been voted if they
had not agreed to observe the voluntary sanctions program of
I966. This transparent maneuver was rejected by admini
stration officials under the Johnson administration.
The Nixon White House was, of course, far more sympa
thetic to business generally than the Johnson administration.
And Union Carbide itself was in good standing. President
Nixon's new Ambassador to Bonn, Kenneth Rush after teaching
Nixon at Duke Law School, had served in important positions
23
at Union Carbide for more than thirty years.
The Union Carbide case was less clear. While it fell
22
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. Oudes, Observer, May 13» 1973. See also
Washington Post, May 19, 1973.
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under the prohibitions of the Executive Order and would vio
late the intent if not the letter of the United Nations
Sanctions resolution of December, 1966, granting the ex
ception might still be justified publicly on hardship
grounds. The legal office of the State Department stated
that "in strictly legal terms," the Union Carbide request
fell under the provisions of the Executive Orders on
Rhodesia and clearly violated the intent of the Security
2.K
Councils Sanctions.
The President subsequently decided that if Union Carbide
established to the satisfaction of the Treasury Department
that it had paid for the chrome before the date of the
January 5, 1967, Executive Order, the license would be
25
issued. J The decision was also reached that American firms
with assets in Rhodesia could sell those assets freely. This
meant that certain American subsidiaries could be sold to
Rhodesia as well as to South African and Portuguese buyers.
The Union Carbide exception was granted on September 18,
1970« This made the Nixon administration the first United
States administration to officially violate United Nations
sanctions, thus making the United States and the White
minority regimes of Portugal and South Africa International
outlaws who refused to comply with United Nations Sanctions.
2k
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Furthermore, the granting of this exception to Union
Carbide and the decision to allow American firms to sell
their Rhodesian assets to all comers suggests that there had
been during 1970, a chance.that a key part of the original
"tar baby" (option two) concept might have become a reality.
As originally framed in the Interdepartmental Group dis
cussion a year before, this option had included a gradual
relaxation of American Sanctions.
"Communication," then, had become by late 1970, a con
ceptual cover for a series of moves that favoured the Smith
regime. It also included American advice to Salisbury. In
early fall of 1971. the United States indicated to Smith its
interest in a negotiated solution.
The message stated that the United States believed a
settlement was in Rhodesia's interest. The American effort
to influence Smith in the direction of some sort of com
promise was consistent with the policy of "communication" as
it was first designed in the summer of 1969. The United
States in 1971 indicated to Smith this policy of a negotiated
solution when Smith was negotiating the terms of his agree
ment with Mr. Home, British Foreign Secretary. But the
failure of the Home-Smith agreement demonstrates the fact
that the white regime must go much faster than it has ever
suggested it would in meeting African demands, if there is to
be an agreement between black and white leaders that can
26Ibic , r. 156.
54
provide a lasting and peaceful solution.
And an American policy of "communication" which con
sisted of potentially bigger carrots and smaller sticks
could only have provided Smith with more comfort than con
cern.
The Byrd Amendment
Opposition to any kind of pressure against Rhodesia
surfaced in the Congress soon after U.D.I. In 1966, Senator
James 0. Eastland introduced a resolution calling for an end
to American economic measures against Rhodesia. But 19&7 >
several "bills had been introduced in the House which con
demned the United Nation's response to U.D.I, and urged the
United States to end its observation of sanctions. None of
these measures mentioned chrome.
The Rhodesian issue lay dormant in the Congress in 1968,
but in 1969, thirteen anti-sanctions resolutions were in
troduced in the House. By 1970, the argument in the Con
gress had changed somewhat, although the sponsor of the
Rhodesian-related resolution in the Senate-S. Res. 367-was
again Senator Eastland. The thrust of Eastland1s measure
was now two fold: to restore trading relations and to re-
27
cognize the Ian Smith government.
And a new argument was introduced: that sanctions had
2?Diane Polan, Irony In Chrome: The, Byrd Amendment
Two Years Later (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace),
p. 3_.
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made the United States dependent on the Soviet Union for a
strategic material, chrome ore. In the House six resolu
tions were introduced in the autumn of 1970, all urging
28
violation of the sanction in some form.
None of these measures passed. In 1971, it was to be a
different story. Early in the year, Rep. James Collins of
Texas introduced H.R. k7±2, which foreshadowed the fyrd
Amendment. Collins* bill was a full-fledged assault: it
called for rewriting the UN Participation Act .of 19^5 to
prevent import prohibitions on "any metal bearing ore from
any free world country for so long as the importation of
like ore from any Communist country is not prohibited by
29
Law." As a proposed Amendment to the U.N. participation
Act, Collins1 bill was in the purview of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee (where it was assigned to the Subcommittee
On International Organizations and Movements). A similar
bill, introduced in the Senate in March by Senator Harry S.
J-Jyrd, Jr. , was assigned to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. After hearings were held in June 1971» in the
House Subcommittee On International Organizations and Move
ments and in early July in the Senate Subcommittee On Africa,
both committees with jurisdiction essentially killed the
Q
Robert J. Janosid, "Southern Africa Pressure Politics,"
Issues (Fall No. 3, 197^), P. 78.
" 2^Diane Polan, Irony In Chrome: The Byrd Amendment




measures. Proponents of the legislation then decided on
another tactic: by removing all mention of the United Nations
from the bill and framing it in terms of national security
and strategic materials, they were able to move it to the
jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees. This ac
complished, the Byrd amendment was reported to the Senate
floor attached to a previously passed House bill, the Mili
tary Procurement Act of 1971. by a unanimous 13-0 vote in
31
the Senate Armed Services Committee. After several attempts
to delete the Rhodesian chrome provision had failed, it was
passed first by the Senate, and then by the House in October,
1971. Section 503 stated that:
Nothwithstanding any other provision of law, on
and after January 1, 1972, the President may not
prohibit or regulate the importation into the
United States of any material determined to be
strategic and critical pursuant to the pro
visions of this Act, if such material is the
product of any foreign country or area not
listed as a communist-dominated country or area
in general headnot 3 (d) of the Tariff sched
ules of the United States (19 U.S.C. 1202), for
so long as the importation into the United States
of material that kind v/hich is the product of
such communist-dominated countries or areas is
not prohibited by any provision of law.32
Interests involved in the passage of the Byrd Amendment
include the chrome-mining companies. Union Carbide, Foote
30
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Mineral and Allegheny Ludlum, the Rhodesia Information Office
(whose lobbying activities raise serious questions of
violation of Resolution 253) and some pro-South African
Organizations. A New York Times article reported that,
"shortly before the vote, a Union Carbide Lobbyist gleefully
told a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff,
we've got the votes."JJ
The arguments made by those who opposed the Byrd Amend
ments were:
—It would violate an international treaty oblication.
This would harm U.S. reputation for reliability and
would have a deleterious effect on the observation
by others of international law itself. In the long
run, at least, the growth of international laws is
in the American interests.
—It would damage the U.S. reputation in predominantly
black Africa, by providing aid and comfort to a white
minority regime in Southern Africa.
—It would hurt the United States8 position at the United
Nations, and harm the U.N. itself.
—It would undermine the British negotiating position.
(As the debate on the Byrd Amendment proceeded in
September and October 1971» the British were negoti
ating with Smith in an effort to arrange terms of
independence that would satisfy Britain's commit
ment to the rights of the Black majority. A pro
visional agreement was reached in November, subject
■ to approval of the Rhodesian majority. A British
commission sent to Rhodesia in 1972 to test the
reaction of the majority found the weight of opinion
clearly opposed to the terms of the proposed settle
ment. The agreement therefore fell through).
—It would give both psychological and economic relief
to the illegal Rhodesian regime and Support develop
ment of an apartheid system there; thus it would ad
versely affect the well-being of the Black population
York Times,, November 12, 1971.
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and the future of Southern Rhodesia.^
None of these points touched many sensitive nerves in Con
gress. And the groups that opposed the Byrd Amendments were
Senators Gale McGee, Congressmen Charles Diggs Jr., and
Donald Fraser. But allied groups such as the American Com
mittee on Africa, the United Steelworkers and the Congress
ional Black Caucus were generally late in getting started,
badly coordinated and poorly financed in their Lobbying
efforts. The most persistent Lobbyist against the Byrd
Amendment was the State Department-and its efforts were
vitiated by the refusal of the White House to weigh in with
phone calls to wavering Senators.
On November 8, 1971, a month after the Amendment's
passage, the African Group at the United Nations issued a
statement attacking the amendment. On November 16, the
General Assembly appealed to the U.S. government not to imple
ment it. On December 3, the (U.N. Sanctions Committee re
commended that the Security Council call on all states not
to pass or implement legislation which would allow the im
port of prohibited goods. The Security Council did so, in
effect, in resolutions of February 28, July 28 and September
29, 19?2. And on May 22, 1973, it requested "States with
legislation permitting importation of minerals and other
■^ Diane Polan, Irony In Chrome: The Bvr d Amendment
Two Years Later (Carnegie Endowment For International
Peace), p. 9«
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products from Rhodesia to repeal it immediately."-^
During the period, prior to the passage of the Byrd
Amendment, on September 27, Senator Fulbright introduced a
new amendment which was co-sponsored by Senator Gale McGee
to give the president the option of determining "that the
national interest or a treaty obligation of the United States
might prevent implementation of Section 503."^ This amend
ment was defeated and Senator McGee blamed the White House
for the passage of the Eyrd Amendment. He said:
At this point one must note with great regret
that during these proceedings, as well as
during the following week's delay, the White
House maintained a Sphinx-like attitude.
Even the Department of State was content to
let its interest be conveyed only by a re
latively low-ranking, albeit highly capable,
civil servant in the Office of Congressional
relations. To our knowledge, no official of
greater rank than a Assistant Secretary of
State made more than a token effort to sup
port the Fulbright-MeGee amendment. And
this bureaucratic inertia-although in
excusable in itself-seemed directly trace
able to the White House attitude. When a
Foreign Relations Committee Staffman asked
a State Department representative to try to
elicit the White House view, he was told it
was better not to press for an answer be
cause the result might be counter pro
ductive to the Senators' position. While
the Senate is by no means slavishly follows
the direction of the Chief Executive, it is
equally the case that White House interven
tion can always influence a substantial
body of votes. There is absolutely no
doubt in my mind that a strong expression of
35Ibid., p. 13.
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interest by the White House-or even the personal
activity of the top State Department officials
could have resulted in upholding U.S. policy on
U.N. sanctions.37
The Senate on October 6 rejected the Fulbright-McGee amend
ment by a vote of 38-44 and thus approved Section 503. After
the Senate approved the Byrd Amendment the House finally ac
cepted it by a vote of 252-101.
Senator McGee said:
Even after President Nixon signed the military pro
curement bill into law-and it was obvious he would
not veto a $21 billion measure to try to delete one
item, in the entirely doubtful event he wished to
do so-there were legal scholars who suggested means
whereby the effect of section 503 might be avoided
or mitigated. In the circumstances, however, this
eventuated in nothing more than fruitless specu
lation. The executive branch response was to the
effect that the President could not flaunt the
supposedly clearly expressed view of the Congress.
No matter that the White House had muchgto do in
a negative way in shaping those views.3
After the passage of the Byrd Amendment in a victory song,
the lobbying team toasted all the participants on Rhodesia's
side as working together for a common cause.
"Oh, 503; Oh 503 3o
Rhodesia's future rode with thee." y
Attempts To Repeal The Byrd Amendment
In President Nixon's third annual report on the State
of U.S. Foreign Policy issued on February 9» 1972, the Presi-
37Ibid., p. 5.
—■■■ 2-8Ibid., p. 6.
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dent discussed the potential of the United Nations, his con
tinued belief in this vital institution, and his concern for
the U.N. in deploring certain congressional actions which is
felt were detrimental to the U.N., the President specified
the point that: "Congress exempted strategic and critical
materials, notably chrome, from the U.S. implementation of
the mandatory U.N. sanctions on imports from Rhodesia."
Moreover, in a report issued by the Secretary of State just
last March, 1972 the following statement was made:
U.N. sanctions, adopted in response to Rhodesia*s
Unilateral Declaration of Independence, remain in
effect. The U.S. firm and effective support of
the U.N. measures is qualified only by the recent
Congressional adoption of the Byrd Amendment
which in effect freed chrome ore from the U.S.
■application of sanctions. The Administration
made clear its opposition to that amendment.^1
Due to these pronouncements by the Nixon administration after
the passage of the Byrd Amendment, Mr. Nixon told Senator
McGee that things would be different the next time around.
McGee took Nixon at his word and introduced a measure which
would reverse the Byrd Amendment. What happened next was
predictable to cynical veterans of Nixon's Southern strategy,
but to McGee it ca .e as a great shock. He said later:
It was my belief that at this point the Admini-
: stration was fully committed to utilizing what
ever means it had at its disposal to see a
successful reversal of October 1972 vote. How
ever, shortly before the May 21st vote on my .
Senator McGee, "U.S. Congress and Rhodesian Chrome."
Issue (Summer 1972), p. 6.
Ibid., p. 6.
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amendment, and much to my concern, it became
apparent that the handling of the Rhodesian
chrome ore question by the administration was
no different than it was last October. This
time I personally appealed to the White House
for assistance. I asked that they make only
five or six telephone calls to marginal Sen
ators on the administration's side of the
Senate aisle-several of whom had already told
me 'a call from the administration would be
necessary to change my vote.1 As it turned
out the White House would have to make only
two calls to turn the tide in favor of repeal
ing the 3yrd Amendment.^2
But not one call was made. The Nixon administration
had put its rhetoric behind Senator McGee's bill and the
United Nations, but it did not lift the telephone even once
to back that rhetoric up. Therefore, it is imperative to
set the record completely straight. After all the high
sounding rhetoric, the White House alone must bear the
burden and the responsibility for the failure of legislative
efforts to turn the United States around on the issue of
sanctions against Rhodesia.
After Senator McGee's bill failed to pass the Senate and
after the Nixon Administration's high sounding rhetoric was
not converted into real support by the Nixon administration
McGee said:
....A high principle is at stake and we cannot
afford to project an image of hypocrisy to the
world by saying one thing and doing another.
The world has become too sophisticated to ac
cept double talk. The time has come when -he
African Nations will also no longer accept
U2
George M. Daniels, Drums of War (New York: Third Press,
197*0 •
63
double talk and hypocrisy from- the United States
as it concerns their vital interests and needs.
Either we believe in the aspirations of the
Black African nations, or we do not. Either we
believe in the United Nations, or not. We can
not have it both ways. The charade must end if
we are to maintain any credibility in the world
at all.^3
In March of 1972 the first small shipment of Rhodesian
chrome ore arrived in the United States, and the Senate
Armed Services Committee voted to approve S. 773t releasing .
it from its role as hostage to the objectives of Senator
Bryd. In the first year since Section 503. total U.S. imports
of ferro-chrome almost doubled over the preceeding year,
1971* The greater part of that increase was due to massive
shipments from both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. For
example, total high and low-carbon ferrochrome imports for
1971 were approximately 85»000 tons gross weight, according
to the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Of that total, almost
22,000 tons came from South Africa about 26%. * In 1972,
total U.S. high and low carbon ferrochrome imports jumped to
over 1^-1,000 tons gross weigh-an increase of 66%. South
Africa accounted for almost 56,000 tons gross weight. Rhodesia,
exporting ferrochrome to the U.S. for the first time since
sanctions began, provided an additional 13.000 tons (gross
weight).
id. , p. I69.
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The significant increase in South African imports-up
44,000 tons-plus the Rhodesian imports together accounted
for k^ffo of U.S. ferrochrome imports in 1972.
And in the first few months of 1973i Rhodesia provided
16,000 tons or nearly k$% of the 36,000 tons of high-carbon
ferrochrome brought into the U.S. In 1973. 48,213 ton
(gross weight) have been imported; 22,572, tons-or 46#-came
from Rhodesia. An additional 14,888 tons was from South
Africa.^7
And U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee said 19
ship loads of Rhodesian strategic materials were imported
into the U.S. between April 1 and October 1 of 1972, in
violation of U.N. sanctions. The items shipped were chrome
48
ore and nickel.
The United States by allowing the passage of the Qrrd
Amendment and by allowing Rhodesian chrome into the United
States had violated article 25 of the U.N. charter which
binds all states, to the decision of the Security Council.
As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United
States could have vetoed the sanctions resolutions and thus
avoided the obligation. It did not. . In fact it supported
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and voted for them. Another question concerns the Presidents
power to implement the sanctions. Did his Executive Orders
implementing sanctions not violate the constitutional powers
of the Congress to regulate foreign trade? In fact, in pass
ing the United Nations Participation Act. 19^5• "the Congress
gave the President express authority to implement sanctions.
That was one of the purpose of the Act. Section 5(a) of the
Act authorized the President, "through any agency which he
may designate," to investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in
whole or in part economic relations..." 9 when the Security
Council called on the U.S. to apply mandatory sanctions.
Thus, since the passage of Section 503. the U.S. has
teen in violation of a legal international obligations.
Nixon's abrupt departure from the White House did not
result in any immediate changes in U.S. policy regarding
sanctions against Rhodesia, largely because Kissinger, who
in trying to resolve the Middle East Crisis between Egypt
'and Israel, found it necessary to leave foreign policy
matters regarding Rhodesia in the hands of State Department
officials.
The Ford Administration
During the two years Ford was in office American policy
towards United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia was not
changed. The United States continued to violate sanctions
legally, and like his predecessor Ford failed to translate
^9Diane Polan, Irony In Chrome; The Byrd Amendment
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its repeated promises into active support of Congressional
efforts to repeal the Byrd Amendment. In August, 1974,
President Ford made a strong statement in favor of the re
peal-' and promised the Black Congressional Caucus that he
would lobby among Republicans toward that end. He changed
his mind, however and backed away from a pledge to send
personal letters to key Republican members of the House of
Representatives urging them to support the repeal bill.
Without the president's support the sponsors of the Bill
decided to withdraw its "minutes before it was scheduled for
consideration" because there were not sufficient votes for
passage.
During 1975t Kissinger continued to suggest that the
Ford administration was in favor of repeal efforts. On
September 23, 1975t for example he told the OAU representa
tives in New York that President Ford and his entire cabinet
continue to urged repeal of the Byrd Amendment and expect
this will be accomplished during the current session of the
Congress.^ Only two days later, the measure was defeated
Two Years Later (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace),
p. 12.
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in the House by a margin of 22 votes. J The Washington
Office On Africa, which has actively lobbied for the repeal
since 1972 accused the administration of total responsibility
for the defeat because it had failed "to act on its statements
of support for sanctions.
Furthermore, the seriousness of Ford's convictions were
reflected in March of 1976, with the administration's con
demnation of Mozambique for its decision to enforce U.N.
sanctions by closing its 800 mile border with Rhodesia.^
-'-'The Washington Office On Africa. Washington Notes On
Africa, October 1975, P« 3
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CHAPTER IV
CARTER'S REACTION TO U.N. SANCTIONS
AGAINST RHODESIA"
Although the Carter administration differs from its
predecessors in some respects, by and large it has continued
with previous policies, slightly adjusted to changing African
realities. Most significantly, American policy now per
ceives Africa as a new terrain in the Cold War. The Carter
administration has clearly given African issues a high
priority. This was inevitable, unless the United States was
to withdraw from the World.
The old order has collapsed, Africa is no longer simply
a collection of colonies, and the struggle for independence
and self-determination is now challenging the long un
challenged dominance of interests in the whole continent.
This change began at the tail end of the Ford admini
stration with the struggle for power in Angola. The incoming
President in January 1977 offered the post of United Nations
Amabassador to Andrew Young, who then claimed responsibility
for U.S. policy in Africa as well. The symbolism in appoint
ing Young was clear~to all: the United States would now make
1George Houser, "Carter's African Policy," Southern
African Perspectives, No. 2, 19?9 (African Fund), p. 3«
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it look as if a black man is in charge of American policy in
Africa. Andrew Young was instructed to deal not only with
the black regimes in Africa, but also with the governments
in South Africa and Rhodesia. The change in style demon
strated by Young's appointment involved more than race,
though, for it was Young who most strongly backed Carter's
desire for a more open policy. As a result, it was in Africa
that Carter's open policy got its first and greatest test as
directed by Carter and executed by former Ambassador Andrew
Young.
In terms of style, the initial steps of President Carter
clearly expressed a desire to depart from the Kissinger
pattern. The second step undertaken by the administration
was the repeal of the Byrd Amendment.
In 1966 the United Nations Security Council voted 11-0
to impose mandatory sanctions against imports of all Rhodesian
products, including chrome. In 1967 and again in 1968,
President Johnson ordered the United States to comply with
the U.N. action.
But in 1971 Congress attached the Byrd amendment to a
military procurement authorization bill (PL92-156). The
effect of the amendment was to exempt Rhodesian chrome ore
and ferrochrome (refine chroming) from the U.N. sanctions.
This placed the United States in direct violation of in
ternational law. While dozens of nations carried on a lively,
if surreptitious, trade with Rhodesia from 1965 onwards, the
United States suffered the embarrassment of having put into
70
law what other nations did convertly. As a statement of
ideal policy direction and reassurance to the black Africans,
the Carter administration strongly "backed the repeal of the
Byrd Amendment.
Congress on March 15, 197? cleared legislation (HR 1746-
PL 95-12) giving President Carter the authority he wanted to
halt U.S. imports of chrome ore from Rhodesia, whose white
minority-ruled government was opposed by most nations of the
world.
The Carter administration called for the trade ban power
as a way to show black Africans that the United States was
committed-beyond policy statements~to majority rule and
equal rights in Rhodesia. Congress completed action on the
bill in time for the President's March 17 address to the
United Nations, which had adopted trade sanctions against
Rhodesia in 1966. The Senate approved HR 1746 March 15 by a
66-26 vote. The House had passed the bill on March l4 by a
250-146 vote.3
Although the United States implemented the U.N. policy
in 1968, Congress three years later approved an amendment
sponsored by Sen. Harry F. Byrd Jr. (Ind. Va.) that barred
the President from refusing to import strategic metals from
non-communist countries. HR 17^6 the so-called Byrd amend-
p
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ment as law, but suspended its provisions as it applied to
imports from Rhodesia. The bill also required foreign steel
suppliers to certify that their products did not contain
Rhodesian chromium.
Congress1 success in 1977 in overturning the Byrd amend
ment where it had failed in the past was attributed to two
factors, one political, one economic. In 1976 the United
States announced that it would support majority rule initia
tives in Southern Africa, a policy the Carter administration
quickly endorsed. In addition, the chrome-dependent stain
less steel industry had announced that it was no longer de
pendent on Rhodesian chromium, the key argument by supporters
of the Byrd amendment in previous debates.
Since 1971, technological advances had permitted the
processing of low quality chromium ore from other sources,
chiefly South Africa and Brazil.-5 But it was the political
argument that dominated debate in the House and Senate.
"President Carter has made it clear that the adoption of this
measure is important to his leadership in the conduct of
African foreign policy," the bills floor manager Donald M.
Fraser (D.Minn.) told the House.
In the Senate, sponsor Dick Clark (D. Iowa) said the
existing chromium trade gave hope to Rhodesian leader Ian




Smith "that in the end the United States will come to his
aid...." U.S. compliance with the United Nations sanctions
Clark added, "will help to encourage Smith to accept a peace
ful settlement.. .that is short of war."'''
The problem with the Byrd amendment its opponents said
was that it undermined the credibility of President Carter's
support of self-determination and majority rule in Rhodesia
and created hostility to the United States among black African
nations, which in the long view could be essential to U.S.
trade interests. Furthermore, they said the amendment
weakened the United Nations as an instrument of peaceful
change and gave the impression that the United States was not
willing to sacrifice a small commercial interest for the
principle of democracy and racial equality.
Tourism represented the second largest source of sorely
needed foreign exchange for the Smith regime. Based on
statistics from surrounding areas, U.S. tourists represented
at least 20 percent of .those visitors.8 The Carter admini
stration did nothing to stop that illegal travel by Americans.
Neither did the administration do anything to close the'
Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, D.C. or the Air
Rhodesia Office in New York City which had been a major arm
of the Rhodesian regime in the United States, Renten Cowley,
general manager of the New York Air Rhodesia Office, also
7Ibid.f p. 239-
United Nations Document S/II78, January 3, 1979.
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acted on behalf of Rhodesia's United Touring Company. The
office operated under the guise of being a noncommercial
tourist information office. Despite U.S. government in
vestigations in 1965, 1968.and 1971t Mr. Cowley maintained a
license from the Treasury department to receive and send
monies to Rhodesia under the "humanitarian" provisions of
the federal government regulations on sanctions.
U.N. Resolution 253 tightened and expanded sanctions,
calling for an end to all trade with Rhodesia. Executive
Order 114-19 (1968) implemented the second U.N. resolution
banning all imports from and exports to Rhodesia, except for
humanitarian purposes. All violations under the executive
orders are subject to fines up to $10,000 and/or prison
terms up to ten years.
The executive orders were further spelled out in regu
lations issued by the enforcing departments. Regulations of
the Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Admini
stration govern many aspects of tourism.
Special FAA Regulation 21 provided in Section 2 that:
c. No U.S. air carrier may operate any aircraft....
1. To or from Southern Rhodesia; or
2. In coordination with any airlines company, or
aircraft registered, in Southern Rhodesia,
whether by connecting flight, interline agree
ment, block booking, ticketing, or any other
method or linking up.
d. The prohibitions in this section apply to the owner,
lessee, operator, or character of the aircraft, and
any other officer, employee, or agent of any of them •
who participates in the prohibited carriage or
operator.
e. Any carriage or operation the purpose or effect of
which is to evade any prohibition of this section
is also prohibited.
The Treasury Departments Office of Foreign Assests Con
trol was assigned to monitor any transfer of funds to
Rhodesia. The office handled this through a licensing pro-
q
cedure to permit only legal transactions.7 The Carter admini
stration knew about this sanction breaking activity by
Americans and the Air Rhodesia Office but did not stop the
activities and the Treasury Department continued sending
money to Rhodesia on the pretext that the travels were
humanitarian.
The Carter administration refused to close the Rhodesian
Information Office, but only prohibited its future funding
by Rhodesia, when they knew that getting funds for the
Rhodesian Information Office will not be a problem. Thus
by allowing the Rhodesian Information Office to open, the
Carter administration gave Smith's illegal regime tacit re
cognition. The United States, Australia, South Africa and
Portugal are the only countries that allowed Rhodesia to have
an Information Office when sanctions were in effect.
°The Corporate Examiner, October 1977, P-C.
10Ibid., P-C.
CHAPTER V
SANCTION BUSTING AMERICAN STYLE
How Rhodesia Got Its Oil
In 1973. Americans learned during the Arab oil embargo,
just what a shortage of Petroleum could do to their liveli
hood. Supposedly a much more serious trade embargo has been
in force against Rhodesia's white minority regime for the
past decade. But petroleum shipments to Rhodesia have con
tinued almost without disruption, in spite of the mandatory
United Nations sanctions which were aimed at achieving major
ity rule.
When sanctions was in effect the tiny white population
of Rhodesia hung onto power with a tenacity few could have
foreseen. But no amount of determination by them could have
kept their economy and military machine operating if they
had not received a steady flow of oil supplies.
The Center for Social Action of the United Church of
Christ, obtained a series of revealing secret documents,
which appear to show that the Mobil Oil Corporation sub
sidiary in South Africa and its subsidiary in Rhodesia joint
ly planned and implemented a decade long-campaign to provide
Rhodesia's oil needs.
Mobil repeatedly denied any sanction breaking activity.
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Mobil's Chairman, Rawleigh Warner, Jr., has said that since
U.S. law forbides Mobil and its affiliates from engaging in
any transactions involving goods destined for Rhodesia,
"the management of Mobil International Division has gone to
considerable effort to make sure that we have complied fully
with the restrictions imposed upon us by the U.S. government
in this connection."
Yet it would appear that if he consulted with his in
ternational Division Executive Vice President who is also a
director of Mobil (South Africa), he might learn that a high
ly sophisticated scheme seems to have been operated by Mobil
(South Africa) for ten years whereby the latter sold oil pro
ducts to Rhodesia through an agreed chain of intermediary
South African Companies, most of which were in fact bogus.
These products were ultimately retailed by oil companies
within Rhodesia, including Mobils Rhodesia subsidiary. The
intention of the scheme seems to have been to allow oil pro
ducts to get through this chain without the eventual desti-
«
nation being discovered by outside observers.
Shortly before UDI, a pipeline to carry crude oil was
built from Beira on the Mozambican coast to Umtali in
1Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (United
Church of Christ, 1976),..p. 3«
2Southern Africa Perspectives, "Sanction Breakers: Sell




Rhodesia. At Umtali an oil refinery was built by a con
sortium in which the principal partners were Mobil, Caltex,
Total, Shell and BP; these were the five foreign oil companies
marketing oil products in Rhodesia. This refinery could pro
duce virtually all the oil products that Rhodesia needed.
However, after the imposition of voluntary sanctions in
November 1965. the refinery was starved of Crude oil.
In the Spring of 1966, the Ian Smith regime attempted
to get around sanctions regulations by arranging through in
termediaries for an oil tanker, the Joann V, to be purchased
while on the high seas. It then sailed to Beira with its
Cargo of some 400,000 tons of crude oil, which was then
enough to provide Rhodesia oil needs for about a year. After
intensive diplomatic activity, the Joanna V was prevented
from unloading its cargo and Britain was empowered by the
United Nations to use force to prevent other tankers from
bringing crude oil to Beira. Britain's naval blockade of
Beira continued until 1976, when the newly independent
Mozambique declared that it would enforce sanctions. (Be
fore independence, Mozambique had been a Portuguese colony,
and Protugal under Salazar and Caetano had refused to imple
ment sanctions).:
Unfortunately for Southern Rhodesia, there was no re
3
Map in Appendix 5- Center For Social Action, The Oil
xConspiracy (United Church of Christ, 19?6), p. 9.
Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (United
Church of Christ, 1976), p. 6. ~~
?8
finery at the other end of the Beira pipeline. Since early
1966, the pipeline has hot been used and the Rhodesian re
finery has fallen into dispair. The oil left in the pipe
line-some 1^,000 tons of it-has lain dormant, and there has
even been dispute as to who owns it.-*
Many thought that this represented the beginning of the
end of Rhodesia. It was impossible to import crude oil, and
the only alternative was to import a whole range of different
of different oil products over lengthy land routes. This would
not only be expensive, but it would also involve evading
sanctions regulations for the importation of each product.
However, to the consternation of those who maintained that
sanctions regulations would finish the Smith regime "within
weeks, not months," it became clear from the reports of
visitors to Rhodesia that oil products were still arriving
from somewhere. Gas stations operated by the Rhodesian sub
sidiaries of Mobil, Caltex, Shell, BP and Total continued
selling their usual range of products.6 The most that the
oil companies in Rhodesia would say was that they bought their
products from a government agency within Southern Rhodesia,
yet their parent companies outside Rhodesia denied supplying
Rhodesia and said that their Rhodesian subsidiaries were be-
their control now being answerable to the illegal Rhodesian
5Ibid., p. 6. .
Newsletter of the Council On Economic Priorities
(Publication N88), p. 2.
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government.'
The Rhodesian government set up a secret agency called
GENTA. Ostensibly a private company, it is obscurely listed
in the Rhodesian telephome book as "GENTA (Pvt.) Limited,"
with an address in Central Salisbury. In fact, it is 100
percent owned by the Rhodesian government, and its chairman
(George Atmore) and operations manager (D. Airey) were pre
viously civil servants in the Ministry of Commerce and In
dustry. Few people in Southern Rhodesia know of Genta's
o
existence, let alone its role.
Genta's actual role since its establishment has been two
fold: firstly, it serves as a front, to act on behalf of
the government; secondly, it exerts a tight control over the
importation into Southern Rhodesia of the principal oil pro
ducts and over the activities of the Southern Rhodesian sub
sidiaries of the various oil companies. Indeed, it was Genta
which arranged the purchasing of the oil tanker Joanna V,
mentioned earlier.
Genta's first significant act was to tell the oil com
panies that it would be responsible for the importation in
to Southern Rhodesia of all fuel products. It would then
sell these to the oil companies within Southern Rhodesia for
subsequent marketing at their respective gas stations. But
n
VRand Daily Mail, February 16, 1966. See also U.D.I.
by Robert Good (Faber and Faber, London, 1973)
8
Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (The
United Church of Christ, 1976), p7~7^ ~
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for non-fuel oil products, such as lubricants, the oil com
panies would have to arrange their own importation, Genta
allocated the importation of Southern Rhodesia's gasoline
(both premium and regular) and diesel and Avtur to one com
pany-Mobil. Other companies were allocated the task of im
porting Rhodesia's requirements of the other fuels-for
instance, Shell imported the Avgas 100/130.9
Before explaining Mobil's role in providing Rhodesia's
fuel needs, it is necessary to provide a little information
on some of the companies and subsidiaries involved.
The Mobil Oil Corporation (USA) is the worlds eight
largest company, with assets and annual sales both valued at
around $9 billion. It is a U.S.-registered company, but it
has subsidiaries registered in dozens of other countries.
Its own principal subsidiaries in South Africa, both wholly-
owned, are:
(a) Mobil oil Southern Africa (Proprietary) limited,
which I will refer to as Mobil (South Africa), and
which internal Mobil documents refer to as MOSA;
and
(b) The Mobil Refining Comapny Southern Africa (Pro
prietary) limited, which I will refer to as
"the" Mobil Refinery (because it runs Mobil's
only refinery in the Southern half of Africa, at
Durban in South Africa), and which internal Mobil
documents refer to as 'Moref.'
Mobil's principal subsidiary in Southern Rhodesia^ also wholly
owned, is Mobil oil Southern Rhodesia (Private) limited. I
will refer to this as Mobil (Rhodesia), and internal Mobil
9Ibid., p. 8.
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documents refer to it as MOSR.
Once the oil refinery in Southern Rhodesia became Starved
of Crude oil, Mobil (Rhodesia) had to obtain nearly all of its
oil products from the Mobil Refinery at Durban. All market
ing of Mobil Refinery, products is carried out by Mobil
(Soiith Africa), so that for Mobil (Rhodesia) to obtain its
oil products, it had to purchase them from Mobil (South
Africa). But here there was a problem, brought about by
sanctions regulations. In the words of Mobil chairman Warner,
these regulations "had the effect of prohibiting the Mobil
group of companies from engaging outside Rhodesia in any
transactions invloving goods...destined for Rhodesia...."
Thus it seems that in order for Mobil (South Africa) to sup
ply Mobil (Rhodesia), some way had to be found to cloak the
transactions so as to get around sanctions regulations.
An elaborate scheme was then devised to make it look as
if Mobil (South Africa) was not involved in any trade with
Southern Rhodesia. The physical transportation of oil pro
ducts from the Mobil refinery to Southern Rhodesia posed no
real problem, since unmarked railway cars were used. The
problem lay in the paperwork, because nowhere in Mobil (South
Africa's) accounts department should there be a copy of an
invoice billing a Southern Rhodesian company.
The scheme consisted of creating what was termed a
"paper-chase"-in Watergate parlance it might be called "laun-
10Ibid., p. 6.
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dering the gasoline."11 This paper-chase was a system where
by sales and payments would be passed through various South
African companies which acted as intermediaries. Thus Mobil
(South Africa) could sell products to a South African company,
knowing that they would eventually sell them to the required
in Southern Rhodesia.
Gasoline Paper-Chase
The method used until August 1968 for the importation
of most of Southern Rhodesia's gasoline requirements, which
is illustrated in Diagram 1. was as follows: On receiving in
structions concerning the quantities required by Genta, Mobil
(South Africa) sold the required amount of gasoline to Sasol.
(This is the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation,
all of whose shares are owned by the Industrial Development
Corporation, itself owned by South African government).
Sasol in turn sold exactly the same amount of gasoline to a
South African company called Parry Leon and Hayhoe, at P.O.
Box 1101, Johnannesburg. Parry Leon and Hayhoe then sent to
Mobil (Rhodesia) a copy of the invoice that they had just
received from Sasol.
This was because it was generally agreed that Parry
Leon should avoid writing out any invoice on which Mobil
(Rhodesia's) name was mentioned; so Mobil (Rhodesia) promised
^Financial Mail, March 5, 1971.
12
Center For Social Action, The Oil Cnnspirary (The
United Church of Christ, 1976), pp. 7-8.
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to treat this copy (of an invoice from Sasol to Parry Leon)
as if it were an invoice made out to them. Mobil (Rhodesia)
then sold the gasoline to Genta. Finally, Genta sold the
gasoline in agreed proportions to the five oil companies in
Rhodesia (Mobil, Caltex, Total, Shell and BP. This meant
that Mobil (Rhodesia) bought back from Genta some of the fuel
it had imported on Genta*s behalf. It also meant that gas
stations in Rhodesia belonging to Shell, BP, Total and Caltex
were all selling gasoline that had been produced at the Mobil
Refinery. The payment scheme then took place in reverse.
Genta paid Mobil (Rhodesia) who paid Parry Leon and Hayhoe,
who paid Sasol, who paid Mobil (South Africa).
. Thus a way had been found for getting gasoline from
Mobil (South Africa) to Genta via Mobil (Rhodesia), with the
active assistance of a South African state-owned Corporation
(Sasol) and without there being any documentary evidence of
a sale to a Rhodesian company by any of the three companies
13
involved in South Africa.
Improved Paper Chase
At Genta's insistance, Mobil (Rhodesia) and Mobil
(South Africa) then devised a more sophisticated method for
importing gasoline. By this time Parry Leon and Hayhoe had
been amalgamated into a large South African firm called
Freight Services Ltd., a shipping and forwarding company
based in Johannesburg, Freight Services Ltd. has from the
13Ibid., p. 10.
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beginning played an absolutely crucial role as a middle-man
in evading of Rhodesian sanctions. The first thing that
Freight Services Ltd. did as part of the "new" method of
sending gasoline to Rhodesia was to rent P.O. Box 31883 at
Braamfontein (in Johannesburg), and to use this as the
address for a bogus company they invented called Minerals Ex
ploration Ltd.
Two other bogus companies were also invented. The first
was called Rand Oils Ltd., this used the mailing address P.O.
Box 2581, Joh.annesburg, and was operated by a man called
David D. Patrick. The second was named the Western Transvaal
Development and Exploration Company, and used the address
P.O. Box 6771 Lichtenburg, Transvaal. This was operated by
an attorney called Arnold Jacobus Oberholzer, of the legal
firm Oberholzer and Van Straaten, at P.O. Box 396, Lichten
The ordering of gasoline was a relatively simple pro
cess. Genta specified to Mobil (Rhodesia) how much gasoline
they wanted from Mobil (South Africa); Mobil (Rhodesia) then
passed this request on by letter, tellex or telephone. As
was illustrated in diagram 1, consecutive shipments of gaso
line were handled in different ways. All would be sold first
Ibid., p. 8. See also the Newsletter of the Council
On Economic Priorities (Publication N88), p. 4.
^Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (The
United Church of Christ, 1976), p. 10.
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"by Mobil (South Africa) to Sasol but then took varying paths*
One shipment would be apparently resold by Sasol to Rand Oils
Ltd., who would "resell" it to the Western Transvaal Develop
ment and Exploration Company (W.T. Development). They, in
turn, would be sold directly by Sasol to Minerals Exploration.
The third would be sold by Sasol to W..T, Development, who
would "resell" it to Rand Oils, who would it to Mineral Ex
ploration. The fourth shipment would then take the first
route again and so on.
However, it was not only the companies involved that were
bogus: at certain stages the very sales were bogus too.
Let us take as an example a shipment of 10,000 litres
of premium gasoline sold along the right hand line, i.e.
from Mobil (South Africa) to Sasol to W.T. Development to Rand
Oils to Minerals Exploration. The first sale, from Mobil
(South Africa) was genuine enough. But then things became
a little more clouded (which was of course the intention).
Sasol filled in an invoice (for example, invoice number
12345), billing W.T. Development for sale of 10,000 litres
of Premium. On receiving this, W.T. Development filled in
an invoice form with the W.T. Development letterhead billing
Rand Oils for the sale of 10,000 litres of premium. On it
Mr. Oberholzer attorney of W.T. Development put the same date
and same invoices number as he found on the invoice he had
Newletter of the Council On Economic Priorities
(Publication N88), p. 2.
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just received from Sasol. When Mr.- Patrick of Rand Oils,
received this invoice, he filled in an invoice from with the
bogus Rand Oil letterhead, again putting the same date and
invoice number and billing Minerals Exploration for the sale
of 10,000 litres of premium.
Minerals Exploration then filled in an invoice billing
a Genta account at the Netherlands Bank (a South African
Bank). The Netherlands Bank had standing instructions to pay-
Minerals Exploration out of the Genta account on receiving
such an invoice from Minerals Exploration. But Minerals
Exploration instead of paying Rand Oils (who had theoretically
sold them the consignment of premium), bypass both them and
W.T.•Development, and made a payment direct to Sasol-despite
the fact that Sasol had never made out a bill to them. Final -
17
ly, Sasol paid Mobil (South Africa). '
To avoid the delays that sometimes resulted from the
large number of middle-men involved, Sasol arranged to send
directly to Minerals Exploration, in a sealed envelope, a
copy of the invoice selling the gasoline to W.T. Development.
Thus Minerals Exploration received a copy of invoice number
123^-5 from Sasol to W.T. Development billing the latter for
10,000 litres of premium. Although Minerals Exploration was
not mentioned anywhere on that invoice, they then knew that
the paper-chase had begun and that some time later they would
receive an invoice number 123^-5 from Rand Oils billing them
17I: .-I. , p. 10.
8?
18
for the same amount of premium. The receipt of the dupli
cate invoice from Sasol to W.T. Development therefore served
as an authorization for Minerals Exploration to proceed
immediately with billing the Netherlands Bank (Genta account)
for the amount of premium mentioned in that duplicate. In
fact, that meant that the bank could then pay them for the
premium before they even received the invoice actually made
out to them by Rands Oils. In Mobil Parlance, Minerals Ex
ploration was authorized to use the duplicate invoice from
19
Sasol as their "action document." 7
Genta was able to keep track of the whole procedure at
one step removed, because whenever the Netherlands Bank re
ceived an invoice from Minerals Exploration, they sent to
Genta a copy of that invoice.
The only place where Mobil (Rhodesia) featured in the
whole business was when Minerals Exploration sent them, for
statistical purposes, those very same copy invoices that they
had received directly from Sasol.
By 1971, the payment procedure had been modified slight
ly, in that the Minerals Exploration bills to Genta were sent
care of the Rhodesian Mission in Johannesburg rather than
1 The Sunday Times (London) October 22, 1978. See also
Bingham Report, September 1978, also Newsletter of the Council
On Economic Priorities, p. 5«
"^Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (The
United Church of Christ, 1976), p. 11.
88
care of the Netherlands Banks.20
The most significant aspect of the whole operation was
that Mobil (Rhodesia) could claim that it was not buying
gasoline from outside Rhodesia. But what was happening was
that Mobil (South Africa) was secreting arranging to supply
Rhodesia with its gasoline requirements. The role of Mobil
(Rhodesia) was to help set up the paper-chase, i.e. the
chain of intermediaries, whereby Genta could import gasoline.
Genta then resold this gasoline to all the oil companies in
Rhodesia-including Mobil.
Various other objectives were achieved by this apparent
ly laborious procedure. Firstly, none of the companies con
cerned sold the premium to an address in Rhodesia- the
nearest they came to it was when Minerals Exploration sold
it to Genta care of their agents in South Africa (i.e. the
Netherlands Bank). Secondly, Minerals Exploration was a
fromt behind which the company doing most of the crucial work
(i.e. Freight Services Ltd.) was able to hide. Thirdly,
neither Rand Oils nor W.T, Development had to be entrusted
with actually handling the vast quantities of money involved
in paying for these shipments. Fourthly, neither of these
two companies was able to compile statistics on the full
extent of the traffic, because neither was involved in all
of the shipments. Finally, there was nowhere within Sasol's
sales department anywhere that Minerals Exploration was buying
Ibid., p. 11.
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so much gasoline from Sasol to Rand Oils or W.T. Development.
This was important, because Sasol is owned by the South
African government, and it could have caused embarrassment if
it was realised that Sasol was selling so much gasoline to a
company acting as a front for Freight Services Ltd., which was
involved in a number of other sanction-breaking activities.
The fact that Sasol was secretly sending duplicate invoices
directly to Minerals Exploration provides some evidence that
Sasol was aware of the true nature of the whole operation.
The Diesel Paper Chase
As with gasoline, the method whereby diesel fuel was
imported into Southern Rhodesia was rendered considerably more
sophisticated from September 1968. Again, most of Southern
Rhodesia's requirements were provided by Mobil (South Africa)
and Minerals Exploration was the key link between them and
Genta. The middle-men between Mobil (South Africa) and
Minerals Exploration (See Diagram 2) were the bogus companies,
Rand Oils, and W.T. Development plus two more (probably bogus)
called Botswana Carriers and Botswana Transport, plus one
whose name was not mentioned and will be called company X.
The payment procedures and the use of copy invoices were the
same as for gasoline importation.
However, by 19?1» the procedure had been somewhat
simplified, in that the number of middle-men between Mobil
(South Africa) and Minerals Exploration were reduced to one,
2"L
The Sunday Times (London) October 22, 19?8.
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namely, the Motor and Industrial Transport Corporation, a
subsidiary of a large South African Company called Bonuskor
Ltd. When Mobil (South Africa) sent an invoice to Motor and
Industrial, they sent it not to their official address, but
to Box 31883 in Eraamfontein-which happens to be the address
of Minerals Exploration, itself a front for Freight Services
22
Ltd. Thus there was not need for Motor and Industrial to
make out an invoice to Minerals Exploration; the Freight
Services employee who handled the mail coming into Box 31883
opened the letters containing invoices addressed to Motor and
Industrial, and then made out similar invoices to Genta on
Minerals Exploration paper as before.
Aviation Turbine Fuel (Avtur)
This, again was imported by Genta from Mobil (South
Africa), who provided all of Rhodesia's requirements. This
time the paper-chase was relatively simple; Freight Services
brought the Avtur from Mobil (South Africa) and sold it
directly to Genta.
Aviation Gasoline (AVGAS)
This was imported in two ways, according to the type of
Avgas. All Rhodesia's, requirements of Avgas 100/130 were
imported by GENTA from Shell (South Africa). Avgas 115/1^5
and Avgas 80 were imported by Genta from Mobil (South Africa)
using two alternative middle men: Trek (a haulage company,
not the better known Trek Petroleum Company) and caritas (a
2?
"ibid. , p. ?.
9.1
firm of clearing agents).
When Mobil (Rhodesia), acting for Genta, ordered Avgas
115/14-5 by telex from Mobil (South Africa), the code word
"pineapples" was used; and the word "paw-paws" was used for
Avtar.23
Non-Fuel Oil Products
Mobil also used the paper-chase concept for importing
into Southern Rhodesia various non-fuel oil products such as
lubricants. Different intermediaries were used for different
products, just as with fuels. Again, as with fuels, the
Mobil refinery in South Africa was almost always the source
of the products. But with these non-fuel products, Genta did
not feature in the buying chain; as has already been stated,
Genta left it to the various oil companies to arrange their
own importation of these products.
The Evidence (Document #1)
From Genta to the Managing Director of Mobil (Rhodesia),
"...we attach a statement detailing estimated requirements
of Petroleum fuels for the period January/April 1974 (...)
we shall be obliged if you will also pass this information
to your associates i.e. Mobil (South Africa),"
(Quote taken from Document #1)
Document #1 is al letter from D. Airey, who is Operations
23
-Tenter For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (The
United Church, of Christ, 19?6), p.Tz." ' ' ; '
Ibid., p. 12. Document in Appendix 6.
92
Manager of Genta, the semi-secret Rhodesian government agency
controlling fuel imports. It is addressed to Berwick Nicol,
Managing Director of Mobil (Rhodesia). Mr. Atmore is Chair
man of Genta. The "visit to Capetwon" refers to visiting the
head office of Mobil South Africa. "Your associate" refers
to Mobil (South Africa).
Document # 2
From Mobil (South Africa) to Mobil (Rhodesia): "...
we should be able to supply your initial requirements of
Hexane without too much trouble. (...) I think you can tell
Rhodesian Industries that we will be able to supply them
during 197^ "
(Quote taken from Document #2).
Note the marked sections, including: (a) the crucial
reference to supplying Mobil (Rhodesia) with some Hexane
apparently originating in the U.S.A. (b) the reference to
the possibility of an embargo being imposed by the American
.government on oil exports from U.S.A. to South Africa or by
the South African government on exports to Rhodesia.
This is a letter from M.H.W. Gubb of Mobil (South Africa),
to Bill Jackson of Mobil (Rhodesia).
Document # 16
From Mobil (Rhodesia) to Mobil (South Africa), concern
ing the flow-diagram for the paper-chase for importing diesel
fuel (See Diagram 2):
id., p. 16. Document #2 Appendix ?,
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The important feature of this plan is that the
original billings by MOSA Mobil (South Africa
to the two or three organizations in the top
line and the subsequent re-billing by those
organizations to the second line and ultimately
the third re-billings by the second line to the
third line are, to all intents and purposes,
meaningless and are merely our false trail being
laid....
You might consider that the procedure that we
have adopted is unduly complicated and un
necessary, but as was conveyed to you when you
were here, it is the wish of George's people
a reference to Genta, whose chairman is George
Atmore that we involve and complicate this
matter to a far greater degree than pertains at
present in the hope that it will discourage an
investigation.
2f>
(Quote taken from Document #16).
Document #17
From an internal Mobil (Rhodesia) report:
When orders for lubricants and solvents are placed
on our South African associates i.e. Mobil (South
Africa) , a carefully planned paper-chase is used
to disguise the final destination of these products,
This is necessary in order to make sure that there
is no link between MOSA Mobil (Rhodesia's) sup
plies. ...
This paper-chase which costs very little to ad
minister, is done primarily to hide the fact that
MOSA is in fact supplying MOSR with product in
contravention of U.S. sanctions regulations,i m • • •
Genta allocates to Mobil the importation of Premium,
Regular, ADO diesel fuel , and Avtur Aviation
turbine fuel. Avtur is imported on behalf of in
dustry despite frequent attempts by Shell to stop
this....While Mobil imports Avtur, other companies
import kerosene, argas....
(Quotes taken from Documents #17).
26Ibid., pp. 3^-38. Document #16 Appendix 8.
2?Ibid., pp. 39-44. Document #17 Appendix 9.
Document #18
From another internal Mobil (Rhodesia) report:
With U.D.I., it became necessary to impose certain
security restrictions so as not to link Mobil
South Africa with Mobil Rhodesia. The East Coast
route i.e. by shio from South Africa to Mozam
bique, and thence by rail to Rhodesia was there
fore, overlooked for the following reasons: (...)
With the East Coast being under heavy surveillance
it was considered undesirable to have Mobil drums
stacked at Mozambique ports, even though the names
of the drums had been painted out.
p u
(Quote taken from Document #18).
Document #il
This part of a 1973 Mobil (Rhodesia) report. Paragraph
four is very important. It suggests that there was a direct
payment from Mobil (Rhodesia) to Mobil (South Africa), which
would be a particular blatant evasion of sanctions regula
tions.29
Legal Points
We will not attempt here to carry out a definite in
terpretation of the law as it applies to sanctions: that
will be left to Mobil's Chairman, who has been quoted. In
this regard it is appropriate here to quote some sections
from U.S. Treasury regulation:
530.201
"All of the following direct or indirect transactions by
any person subject tu the jurisdiction of tne United States
Ibid., pp. 45-48. Document #18 Appendix 10.
Ibid., p. 23. Document #11 Appendix 11.
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"Transfers of property which invilve merchandise
destined to Southern Rhodesia or to or for the account of
business nationals thereof;
"Other transfers of property to or on behalf of or for
the benefit of any person in Southern Rhodesia (including
the authorities thereof)...."
530.301
"The term "person" means an individual, partnership,
association, corporation, or other organization."
530.307
The term person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States" includes:
1. Any person, wheresoever located, who is a citizen
or resident of the United States;
2. Any person actually within the United States;
3. Any Corporation organized under the laws of the
United States or of any state territory, possession,
or district of the United States; and
4. Any partnership, association, corporation, or other
organization organized under the laws of, or having
its principal place of business in, Southern Rhodesia
which is owned or controlled by persons specified
in subparagraphs (1), (2) or (3) of this paragraph.
530.W
Section 530*201 prohibits persons subjects to the
jurisdiction of the United States who are officers
directions or principal managerial personnel of
business enterprises in foreign countries from
being involved in any transaction subject to 530.
201. Such persons are involved in transactions
when they authorize or permit the foreign busi-
._ ness enterprise to engage in a transaction sub
ject to 530.201, even if they do not themselves
actively engage in the transaction.
"Section 530.201 prohibits persons who directly or in
directly own or control any person in Southern Rhodesia from
authorizing or permitting the latter to engage in any trans
fer of property prohibited by 530.20."3°
It will be noted that subsidiaries of U.S. corporations
which are not organized under the laws of Rhodesia or which
have their principal place of business outside Rhodesia-for
example, a South African subsidiary-are not listed as "in
cluded" in this administrative interpretation of the Execu
tive Order. This constitutes a major apparent loophole which
is found in parallel regulations dealing with trading with
other "enemies." However, the sanctions regulations do
cover Rhodesian subsidiaries, and goods of U.S. origin and
U.S. citizens.
The Mobil case would seem to involve all of these. It
must be presumed that Mobil (U.S.A.) and/or its officers and
managers had reason to know of the activities which Mobil
Rhodesia was carrying on with Mobil South African subsidiary.
Bearing in mind the evidence on sanctions evasion that
has been presented, it would appear that section 530.4-04-
applies to any American citizen such as the director of
Mobil(South Africa) who has knowledge of an illegal trans
action.
—Everett S. Checket is an American citizen. He is a
member of board of directors of Mobil (South Africa). He is
Ibid., pp. 30-31, (or check Executive Orders).
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also Executive Vice President (second only to the President)
if the International Division of Mobil Oil Corporation, which
owns Mobil (South Africa). One of the countries he is re
sponsible for within the Mobil empire is South Africa. It is
to him that William Beck, Chairman of Mobil (South Africa)
31
has to report.
In November 1975. the chairman of Mobil wrote the letter
we have already quoted, in which he said: "The management
of our international division has gone to considerable effort
to make sure that we have complied fully with the restrictions
imposed upon us by the U.S. government in connection with
sanctions regulations."
—Charles E. Solomon is an American citizen. At the
time when almost all of the documents I have quoted when
this report was written, he was a member of the board of
Mobil (Southern Africa). He was also President of the Inter
national Division of Mobil Oil Corporation, and a member of
£ts board.
—Faneuil Adams Jr is an American citizen. He is Vice
President of Planning in the International Division of Mobil
Oil Corporation. From 1972 to 1975 he was President of
Mobil South Inc. At that time he was also on the board of





It is hard to imagine that the sanctions breaking ac
tivities of Mobil (South Africa) were unknown to its board;
after all they involved business worth tens of millions of
dollars, which would normally be reported on and evaluated
at board meetings. And with three U.S. citizens who are of
have been directors of Mobil (South Africa) and every senior
executives within Mobil (USA), it is difficult to see how
Mobil (USA) could be said not to know of the sanctions-
breaking activities of its subsidiary.
American Carriers And Sanctions Busting
Flying to Rhodesia can be one of the easiest experiences
an American traveller might have if he has visited or is
planning to visit foreign lands. No Visa is required, just
one or two innoculations, a passport, and a confirmed onward
reservation. And your air travel reservations? Drop by your
Pan American ticket counter here in the United States and in
seconds the computer will confirm your space on an Air
•Rhodesia flight from Johannesburg, South Africa to the
Rhodesian Capital of Salisbury.
This has been the experience, at least, of many
Americans who travelled to Rhodesia during the past few years.
It is all very convenient. The trouble is that when Pan
American, TWA and other American carriers help make the going
great to Salisbury, they apparently do it illegally.
Acting under authority granted by the United Nations
Participation Act of 19^5» the President issued Executive
Orders 11322 and 114-19 dated January 5. 1967 and July 29,
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1968, which defined American participation in the sanctions.
These orders have the force of law. Under Section 5(b) of
the United Nations Participation Act, any person "who will
fully violates or evades or attempts to violate or evade"
such an Order is subject, upon conviction, to a fine of not
more than $10,000, imprisonment for not more than ten years
or both.
The Executive Orders prohibited, with certain humani
tarian, educational and other exceptions:
—Transfer of Funds directly or indirectly to any person
or body in Rhodesia;
—Operation of any United States Air Carrier or aircraft
owned or chartered by any person subject to the juris
diction of the United States or of United States
registration (i) to or from Southern Rhodesia or
(ii) in coordination with any airline company con
stituted or aircraft registered in Rhodesia.33
Thus, the regulations issued by the American government
appear explicit. And, considering the penalties for their
violation, they have teeth. But somehow their bite has been
less inhibiting than it could be.
And from 1972-1974- a study on Rhodesia was carried out by
Anthony Lake with funding from the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. On July 15, 1973 f Mr. Lake went to Pan-
American offices in Washington and made a reservation in the
name of Lake on Air Rhodesia flight 876 for October 7, 1973,
from the Rhodesian capital, Salisbury, to Bantyre, Malawi.
Reservations were also made for other flights in a planned
Full text of Executive Orders and U.N. Resolutions in
Appendix.
a.o.o
journey from Washington to Salisbury and back. The reser
vation was confirmed within seconds by Pan American's com
puter. On August 8f 19731 a reservation was made in the
name of Stephen Park at the TWA office in Washington for
travel to Africa and back. It included Air Rhodesia flights
873 and 731. The tickets for all the flights from Washington
to Salisbury and back were paid for by major American credit
cards.
Pan American and TWA were asked by these two gentlemen
if there would be problems getting into Rhodesia due to the
sanctions program. In neither case did their ticket agents
seem particularly aware of the sanctions. Both offices
assured Mr. Lake and Mr. Park that all that is required to
enter Rhodesia is a valid passport, an onward reservation,
and a smallpox vaccination (according to Pan American) or a
3*5
yellow fever innoculation (According to TWA). J Pan
American is apparently acting in violation of two sections
of Executive Order 114-19, and TWA is probably in violation
of at least one, if hot both of them.
Section l(g) of the Order prohibits "Operation of any
U.S. carrier or aircraft owned or chartered by any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or of United
States registration (i) to or from Southern Rhodesia or
34
v Anthony Lake, Business As Usual (The Carnegie Endow
ment For International Peace, 197^0, P« 6-
35., p. 6.
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(ii) in coordination with any airline company constituted or
aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia." (Emphasis added).,-^
The Executive Order was defined in greater detail by
Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 21, promulgated
September 18, 1968 by the Federal Aviation Administration:
"No U.S. air carrier may operate any aircraft....(2) In co
ordination with any airline company constituted, or aircraft
registered, in Southern Rhodesia, whether by connecting flight,
inter-line agreement, block booking, ticketing, or any other
method of link up."-5?
Both Pan American and TWA will make' reservation for
connecting flights into or from Rhodesia on South African
Airways, Air Rhodesia or Air Malawi. In addition, tickets
for these connecting flights will be issued by Pan American
and TWA.
Pan American airline does hold a block of seats on Air
Rhodesia flights that it can sell up to four days before any
particular flight. This arrangement, is part of an inter-
line agreement between Pan American and Air Rhodesia. Thus
Pan American is acting in violation of the specific pro
visions of special federal aviation regulation No. 21. TWA
also has an inter-line agreement with Air Rhodesia.
See Appendix.
37
Federal Aviation Administration Enforcement of Air
Traffic Sanctions, pp. 178-180.
38Ibid., p. 7.
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Section l(f) of Executive Order 11419 prohibits "trans
fer by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States directly or indirectly to any person or body in
Southern Rhodesia of any finds or other financial or economic
39
resources."^7
Both Pan American and TWA receive from the customer the
full payment of the airfare from Washington to Salisbury and
return, including payment for flights on other airlines.
They then transfer those payments to connecting carriers.
When the connecting carrier is Air Rhodesia, this would
seem clearly to be a "transfer of funds to a person or body
in Southern Rhodesia."
Transfer of funds among international air carriers re
portedly takes place in one of two ways. The most common
method is through the International Air Transport Association
(IATA), an independent organization which, among other
functions, serves as a clearing house through which inter
national airlines settle accounts with each other. And Air-
Rhodesia is not a member of this organization.
This leaves the second method of payment, direct billing,
as the means by which Pan American and TWA apparently trans
ferred funds to Air Rhodesia. In the study by Anthony Lake
a Pan American official confirmed in a telephone interview
that, that was the method used by that airline. Also in the




in 1972 approximately $2 00,000.^° •
This raise questions, of course, about how the Executive
Orders were implemented by the U.S. government. According
to Lake's report, there is some doubt'the meticulousness
with which the government had monitored compliance by
American air carriers with the executive order and the FAA
regulation. In the report it is stated that:
Some government officials recall that checks were
made some years ago with Pan American and others.
Other officials aren't able to substantiate this
and one Pan American official who had some re
sponsibility in this area could not recall such
attention from the government. An FAA official,
after reviewing his files, stated that no con
tact with members of the airlines industry was
ever made.^1
•Section 2(b) of the Executive Order delegates "To the
Secretary of Transportation, the function and responsibility
of enforcement relating to the operation of air carriers and
aircraft...." With the Department of Transportation, the
Federal Aviation Administration has been given enforcement
responsibility. In the report by Lake the FAA does not have
any monitoring system to keep the Agency informed of what
the airlines are doing with regard to Rhodesia sanctions.
The FAA thus apparently relies on the knowledge of the
regulations by officials of American Air Carriers, and their
willingness to comply with them. And, Pan American, TWA and
40
Anthony Lake, Business As Usual (The Carnegie Endowment
For International Peace, 197*0, PP. ti—9•
id., p. 9.
perhaps other American carriers are apparently unaware of the
regulations or consciously acting in violation of them.
Section 2(c) of the Executive Order 11419 delegates to
the Secretary of the Treasury in effect, responsibility for
enforcement of Section l(d), which governs the transfer of
"financial or economic resources" to Rhodesia. Pan American
and TWA and perhaps other carriers were remitting funds to
Air Rhodesia, their apparent violation of the executive order
would fall within the Treasury Department's purview. Yet
somehow the Treasury Department was apparently unaware of
these and other transfers.
Rent A Car In Rhodesia
While American carriers will smooth your way into
Salisbury, Hertz and Avis offices in the United States are
apparently glad to reserve a Hertz or Avis car for your use
in Rhodesia.
In the report by Lake, a letter from Avis dated August
2# 1973f stated that Avis in Rhodesia is an independent
company-an "independent sub-license"-which has a sub-license
to operate under Avis" name. This licensing arrangement came
into being approximately September 1971, according to the
letter from Avis. In the same report a Hertz official con
firmed Hertz has the same arrangement with a subsidiary in
Rhodesia.
These arrangements are in violation of Sanction l(d) of
Executive Order 11419. As noted previously, this section
prohibits the sale or supply of any commodities or products
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to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any person
or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or
operated from Southern Rhodesia, then Hertz and Avis are
clearly supplying commodities to Rhodesian companies. One
common definition of "commodity" is that it is something
useful or valuable. Since their foreign licenses and sub
licensees pay for the right to use the names of Avis and
Hertz, those names are something useful or valuable. And,
obviously these names are used for business purposes.
Tourism To Rhodesia
A visitor to the Office of Air Rhodesia and the Rhodesian
National Touris Board in New York can pick up travel bro
chures advertising package tours to Africa, including
Rhodesia, run by Bennet Tours, Percival Tours, Merriman and
Finnerty Associates, Orbitair International and United
Touring Company. (All but the last are American-based com-
panies. United Touring Company is a Rhodesian concern).
Jncluded in these brochures are invitations to visit the
"garden capital" and Rhodesia's Victoria Falls, "quite likely
to be one of the great memories of your life. An indescrib-
4.3
able experience. Words fail...."
There is no mention that the U.N. has imposed sanctions
against Rhodesia. Nor that Security Council resolution 253
Li
Corporate Information Center Brief, October 197^, p. D.
'Anthony Lake, Business As Usual (Carnegie Endowment
for. International Peace, 197^), p.. 13»
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of May 29, 1968;
4 decides that all member states of the U.N. shall
not make available to the illegal regime in Southern
Rhodesia or to any commercial, industrial or public
utility undertaking, including tourist enterprises,
in Southern Khodesia-any funds for investment or any
other financial or economic resources and shall pre
vent ^their nationals and any person within their
territories from making available to the regime or to
any such undertaking any such funds or resources....
On August 20, 197^» columnist Jack Anderson revealed
that hundreds of travel agencies in the U.S. have for years
been violating federal regulations on sanctions by arranging
44
tourism to Rhodesia.
Tourism represents the second largest source of sorely
needed foreign exchange for the illegal Smith Regime. United
States tourists represent at least 20 percent of all visitors
to Rhodesia. Air Rhodesia's computer print-outs for March
197^ showed 16,406 persons booked by U.S. travel agents and
airlines on flights connecting with Air Rhodesia for the
rest of the year. And such an influx nets Rhodesia at least
J6.3 million per year in foreign exchange.
Despite regulatory actions there remain ways in which
travel agencies can arrange tourism from the U.S. to Rhodesia
(via South Africa). The Treasury Department continues to
issue licensese to travel agencies on behalf of tourists to
expend money within Rhodesia, as well as transfer money to
46
ground tour companies in Rhodesia such as United Touring.





For at least 12 years, the United States pursued a
double-faced policy towards Rhodesia-openly claiming to
support the demand of the 96 percent African population for
majority rule but convertly giving a steady stream of
material and psychological support to the illegitimate mi
nority regime. The United States voted to support sanctions,
and various executive orders made it unlawful for anyone in
the U.S. to trade with Rhodesia in any way. The penalties
were severe, and on paper itseemed that the U.S. was com
mitted to implementing sanctions. In practice, however the
United States has been second only to South Africa in sanc
tion-busting. The reason is to be found in the secret 1969
National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39). The first
and undoubtedly the most desirable option from the standpoint
of imperialist interests is support for the status quo. A
prosettler option, as attested by Dr. Henry Kissinger's
first major Southern Africa policy in the form of option 2
of the National Security Study Memorandum 39 of 1969, is
based ori two basic assumptions that white settlers are the
most dependable allies of imperialism. They are especially
valuable from the standpoint of the stake Western countries
■S/Iohammed El-Kawas and Barry Cohen (eds.)i The Kissinger
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have in maintaining their access to. the enormous mineral
wealth in Southern Africa. Unlike the imperialists' non-
European allies, they cannot be expected to deny their
countries of origin or of reference access to those raw
materials vital to the functioning of their economies. With
fresh memories of how the most reactionary Arab Sheiks joined
the oil embargo following the October war, the authors of the
December 197^ special of the U.S. Council On International
Economic Policy on "Critical Imported Materials" concluded
that "South Africa would be unlikely to participate in any
embargo of exports to the United States, Western Europe, or
Japan." As embargo-proof areas, colonial-settler formations
deserve the strongest Western or imperialistic support. This
support is gladly provided, even when ritualist denunciations
of racism, illegal statehood or occupation and violations of
human rights seem to be calling it into question. The support
itself is based on the second basic assumption that the
settlers have the situation under control. This is what the
authors of the NSSM 39 thought obtained in Southern Africa in
1969.
The Byrd amendment ripped a hole in the sanctions dike.
Study of Southern Africa (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence
Hill and Company, 196?).
p
Cited by Edgar Lockwood in his preface in El-Kawas and
Cohen, The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa (Westport,
Connecticut: . Lawrence Hill and Company, 1976), p. l4.
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Between 1972 and January 1973 the value of Rhodesian exports
to the United States amounted to $13•3 million. This was
only slightly less than the exports in I965 prior to UDI
when they reached $1^.1 million.
Rhodesia was not a country to which the Secretary of
State forbad Americans to travel. An American passport
states that it is not good for travel to Cuba, North Vietnam
and North Korea. Some way or another the United States seemed
to find the legal authority to ban travel to communist
countries even though they are not under international in
terdict, while the U.S. cannot find legal grounds to restrict
travel to Rhodesia. The most effective way to prevent
American travelers from spending money in Rhodesia in vio
lation of Resolution 253 would be to restrict their right to
travel under American passport to that country, but no
American Administration have ever tried to use this route to
stop Americans traveling to Rhodesia.
Notwithstanding Sections 5(a) and (b) of Security Council
Resolution 253, the State Department did not refuse visas to
known agents of Rhodesian business including tourism. Mr.
Traves Nettleton, a principal agent of Rhodesia's tourist,
industry, was allowed to enter the United States to make his
pitch in New York for breaking sanctions in March 1975•
■^Edgar Lockwood, "Testimony On Rhodesia nd U.S. Foreign
Policy," Issue 3:3 (Fall, 1973). .
The Corporate Examiner, "Tourism to Rhodesia: Break
ing Sanctions," (October, 197*0*
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In 1973 the Rhodesian airline, through its assistant
general manager, Merrin Eyett, purchased three Boeing ?20's
from Carl Hirshmann, a Swiss banker who has large business
interests in Europe, Africa and the United States. Hirshmann
had obtained U.S. export licenses in 1970 for the purchase of
these planes and in 1973 for spare parts worth over $500,000.
The license contained a standard clause that the U.S. govern
ment must authorize all resale, but little or nothing was
done to prosecute Hirshmann or to prevent him from making
such sales again. His firm Jet Aviation was taken off the
"Station license" list, but this does not necessarily mean
that he will not be able to buy or export U.S. planes again.^
The Boeings have boosted Rhodesia's traffic to .Johannesburg
by 53 percent and to Durbann by 62 percent for the year end
ing June, 197^. Captain Pat Travers, the Chief Executive of
Air Rhodesia was quoted by the Johannesburg Star as saying:
"The impact of the Boeings has been far greater than we ever
imagined...beyond our wildest dreams." Air Rhodesia had a
neat $705,600 profit in a year which was a disaster for most
airlines.
United States government have allowed Rhodesia to recruit
mercenaries in the U.S., the U.S. is the only country in the
World that allows the Rhodesian information office to operate.
Furthermore, the U.S. allows the Journal of Commerce to con-
David Ottaway, Washington Post, A23 (January 25, 1974).
Johannesburg Star (October 12, 1974), Airmail Edition.
ill
tinue to publish advertisements which promote activities
which are violations of sanctions, namely investments and
"business dealings with Rhodesia. The first amendment clear
ly does not give persons the right to openly promote violation
of the law.
The Carter administration increased its verbal support
for the bringing down of the minority regime of Ian Smith,
but when the first test of closing the Rhodesian Information
Office in Washington came up the Carter administration re
fused to close it down. Thus we see a parallel between the
Carter and Johnson administration, with high sounding rhetoric
but extremely limited anti-Smith action. Furthermore, the
Carter administration's sudden interest in Southern Africa is
not because the administration v/ants change but rather it is
due to the cold world mentality. On July 1, 197? Secretary
of State Vance's statement on African policy said:
A negative, reactive American policy that seeks
only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in
Africa would be dangerous and futile. Our best
course is to help resolve the problems which
create opportunities for external intervention.
Specifically, on the Katangan action in Shaba
in March 1977 Vance said, We see no advantage
in unilateral responses and emphasizing their
East-West implications.'
Among the 1^7 members of the Assembly at its close in
December of 1976, the United States had compiled a unique
record: it was the only country that did not vote "yes" on
'George M. Houser, "Carter's African Policy," in
Southern African Perspectives (African Fund), No. 2179» P*
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a single Southern Africa resolution put to a role call vote.
Of the 25 resolutions submitted for roll call tallies, all
passed with more than 90 countries in favor. The U.S., on
the other hand abstained 13 times, voted against 10 times,
did not vote twice and never cast a vote in favor.
Why did this "great democracy" that had condemned UDI
and the oppressiveness of the Rhodesian political system
violate the sanction resolutions of the United Nations? The
answer is clear. Condemning UDI is one thing;, participating
in the overthrow of a white government to be replaced by an
African government is another. The Western states are not
prepared to throw one of their own to the dogs. Since eco
nomic sanctions were directed towards overthrowing the
Rhodesian government, the Western World was not prepared to
take active part. And yet these same governments had to
appear to be supporting the sanction measures. Furthermore,
the Western World did not want sanctions to be effective due
to the fact that this could have set a precedent for sanctions
on South Africa.
The strategic and economic interests of the United States
in Southern Africa are of major importance and explains why
the United States did not want sanctions to bring down the
Smith regime during the time period in question. "The strate
gic interest of U.S. policy stemmed from South Africa*s
Q
The African Fund, Southern Africa; The U.S. Record At
the.U.N., 1976.
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geographical location, especially the cape coast sea route
to oil in the Middle East. The U.S. position in the Indian
Ocean was once supported by the Simonstown Naval Base and by
missile-tracking stations established on South African
territory; these operations have been relocated on Diego
Garcia, a small island situated in the Indian Ocean off the
coast of South Africa. With the continent's most military
capability, including nuclear capacity, South Africa was
perceived as a pro-Western outpost against Soviet and Chinese
incursions into the whole region*
The economic interest in Southern Africa was also of
great direct importance to the United States. Of about
$700 million in private investment in South Africa, $528
million is direct investment and the remainder portfolio in-
o
vestment.y
As such, the white settler dictatorship of Pretoria
emerged as a bulwark to the NATO economies of Europe, which
would collapse without Middle East oil. Thus, even if the
U.S. could satisfy American needs from domestic sources, it
had to act to preserve the economic and defense interests of
the Western World alliance.
^William H. Hance, Southern Africa and the United States.
(Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 25.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON RHODESIA
Text of Pesolution 232 (1966)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of November 12,
1965, 217 (1965) of November 20, 1965, and 221.(1966) of
April 91 1966, and in particular its appeal to all States to
do their utmost in order to break off economic relations with
Southern Rhodesia.
Deeply concerned that the Council's efforts so far and
the measures taken by the administering Power have failed to
bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end.
Reaffirming that to the extent not suspended in this
resolution, the measures provided for in resolution 217
(I965) of November 20, 1965, as well as those initiated by
Member States in implementation of that resolution, shall con
tinue in effect.
Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United
Nations Charter,
1. Determines that the present situation in Southern
Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and
security;




(a) the import into their territories of asbestos, iron
ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat
products and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern
Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this
resolution;
(b) any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to promote the
export of these commodities from Southern Rhodesia and any
dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any
of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and ex
ported therefrom after the date of this resolution, in
cluding in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rho
desia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
(c) shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration
of any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia
and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;
(d) any activities by their nationals or in their terri
tories which promote or are calculated to promote the sale or
shipment to Southern Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types,
military aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment and
materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and
ammunition in Southern Rhodesia;
(e) any activities by their nationals or in their terri
tories which promote or are calculated to promote the supply
to Southern Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles
and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly
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of maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern
Rhodesia: the shipment in vessels and aircraft of their
registration of any such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia:
and any activities by their nationals or in their territories
which promote or are calculated to promote the manufacture
or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia;
(f) participation in their territories or territories un
der their administration or in land or air transport facili
ties or by their nationals or vessels of their registration
in the supply of oil or oil products in Southern Rhodesia;
notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses grant
ed before the date of this resolution;
3. Reminds Member States that the failure or refusal by
any of them to implement the present resolution shall con
stitute a violation of Article 25 of the Charter;
k. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of
Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance
with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly
resolution 151^ (XV); and recognizes the legitimacy of their
struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth
in the Charter of the United Nations;
5. Calls upon all States not to render financial or other
economic aid to the illegal racist regime in Southern Rhodesia;
6. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations
to carry out this decision of the Security Council in accord
ance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter;
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7. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members
of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;
8. Call upon States Member of the United Nations or of
the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General
the measures each has taken in accordance with the provisions
of paragrahp 2 of the present resolution;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Council on the progress of the implementation of the present
resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than
March 1, 1967;
10. Deceides to keep this item on its agenda for further
action as appropriate in the light of developments.
Text of Resolution 253 (1968)
The Security Council,
Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of
\2 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 221 (1966)
of 9 April 1966, and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966,
Taking note of resolution 2262 (XXII) adopted by the
General Assembly on 3 November 1967.
Noting with great concern that the measures taken so far
have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an
end,
Reaffirming that to the extent not superseded in this
resolution, the measures provided 1 • in resolutions 217
(I965) of 20 November 1965, and 23.: .1966) of December 1966,
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as well as those initiated by Member States in implementation
of those resolutions, shall continue in effect.
Gravely concerned that the measures taken by the Security
Council have not been complied with by all States and that
some States, contrary to resolution 232 (1966) of the Secu
rity Council and to their obligations under Article 25 of the
Charter, have failed to prevent trade with the illegal regime
in Southern Rhodesia,
Condemning the recent inhuman executions carried out by
the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia which have flagrantly
affronted the consience of mankind and have been universally
condemned.
Affirming the primary responsibility of the Government
of the United Kingdom to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia
to achieve self-determination and independence, and in partic
ular their responsibility for dealing with the prevailing
situation,
Recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle of the people
of Southern Rhodesia to secure the enjoyment of their rights
as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in con
formity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution
151^ (XV),
Reaffirming its determination that the present situation
in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international
peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
1. Condemns all measures of political repression, in-
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eluding arrests, detentions, trials and executions which
violate fundamental freedoms and rights of the people of Sou
thern Rhodesia, and calls upon the Government of the United
Kingdom to take all possible measures to put an end to such
actions;
2. Calls upon the United Kingdom as the administering
Power in the discharge of its responsibility to take urgently
all effective measures to bring to an end the rebellion in
Southern Rhodesia, and enable the people to secure the enjoy
ment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General
Assembly resolution 151^- (XV);
3. Decides that, in furtherance of the objective of
ending the rebellion, all States Members of the United Nations
shall prevents
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities
and products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported
therefrom after the date of this resolution (whether or not
the commodities or products are for consumption or processing
in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond
and whether or not any special legal status with respect to
the import of goods is enjoyed by the port or other place
where they are imported or stored);
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their terri
tories which would promote or are calculated to promote the
export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia;
and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories
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in any commodities or products originating in Southern Ehodesia
and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, in
cluding in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rho
desia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
(c) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their regis
tration or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage
(whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across
their territories of any commodities or products originating
in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of
this resolution;
(d) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their
territories of any commodities or products (whether or not
originating in their territories, but not including supplies
intended strictly for medical purposes, educational equip
ment and material for use in schools and other educational
institutions, publications, news material and, in special
humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs) to any person or
body in Southern Rhodesia or to any other person or body for
the purposes of any business carried on in or opearated from
Southern Rhodesia, and any activities which promote or are
calculated to promote such sale or supply;
(e) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their regis
tration, or under charter to their nationals or the carriage
(whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across
their territories of any such commodities or products which
are consigned to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia, or
to any other person or body for the purposes of any business
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carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia;
4. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations
shall not make available to the illegal regime in Southern
Rhodesia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility-
undertaking, including tourist enterprises, in Southern Rho
desia any funds for investment or any other financial or
economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any
persons within their territories from making available to the
regime or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources
and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies with
in Southern Rhodesia except payments exclusively for pensions
or for strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes
or for the provision of news material and in special humani
tarian circumstances, food-stuffs;
5. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations
shall:
(a) Prevent the entry into their territories, save on
exceptional humanitarian grounds, of any person travelling on
a Southern Rhodesian passport, regardless of its date of
issue, or on a purported passport issued by or on behalf of
the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia; and
(b) Take all possible measures to prevent the entry into
their territories of persons whom they have reason to believe
to be oridinarily residents in Southern Rhodesia and whom
they have reason to believe to have further or encouraged, or
to be likely to further or encourage, the unlawful actions of
the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia or any activities
131
which are calculated to evade any measure decided upon in
this resolution or resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966;
6. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations
shall prevent airline companies constituted in their terri
tories and aircraft of their registration or under charter
to their nationals from operating on or from Southern Rhodesia
and from linking up with any airline company constituted or
sircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia;
7. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations
shall give effect to the decisions set out in operative
paragraphs 3i^-i5. and 6 of this resolution notwithstanding
any contract entered into or license granted before the date
of this resolution;
8. Calls upon States Members of the United Nations or
of the specialized agencies to take all possible measures to
prevent activities by their nationals a d persons in their
territories promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to
Southern Rhodesia, with a view to stopping such emigration;
9« Requests all States Members of the United Nations or
of the specialized agencies to take all possible further action
under Article kl of the Charter to deal with the situation in
Southern Rhodesia, nor excluding any of the measures provided
in that Article;
10. Emphasizes the need for the withdrawal of all consular
and trade representation in Southern Rhodesia, in addition to
the provisions of operative paragraph 6 of resolution 217
(1965);
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11. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations
to carry out these decisions of the Security Council in accord
ance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and re
minds them that failure or refusal by any one of them to do
so would sonstitute a violation of that Article;
12. Deplores the attitude of States that have not com
plied with their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter,
and censures in particular those States which have persisted
in trading with the illegal regime in defiance of the re
solutions of the Security Council, and which have given active
assistance to the regime;
13• Urges all States Members of the United to render
moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rho
desia in their struggle to achieve their freedom and independ
ence;
1^. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members
of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions
of the present resolution;
15. Requests States Members of the United Nations , the
Nations Organization, the specialized agencies, and other
international organizations in the United Nations system to
extend assistance to Zambia as a matter of priority with a
view to helping her solve such special economic problems as
she may be confronted with arising from the carrying out of
these decisions of the Security Council;
16. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations,
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and in particular those with primary responsibility under the
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and secu
rity, to assist effectively in the implementation of the
measures called for "by the present resolution;
1?. Considers that the United Kingdom as the administer
ing Power should ensure that no settlement is reached with
out taking into account the views of the people of Southern
Rhodesia, and in particular the political parties favouring
majority rule, and that it is acceptable to the people of
Southern Rhodesia as a whole;
18. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations
of of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-
General by 1 August 1968 on measures taken to implement the
present resolution;
19. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council on the progress of the implementation of
this resolution, the first report to be made not later than
1 September 1968;
20. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28
of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council,
a committee of the Security Council to undertake the following
tasks and to report to it with its observations;
(a) To examine such reports on the implementation of the
present resolution as are submitted by the Secretary-General;
(b) To seek from any States Members of the United Nations
or of the specialized agencies such further information re
garding the trade of that State (including information regard-
ing the commodities and products exempted from the pro
hibition contained in operative paragraph 3 (d) above) or re
garding any activities by any nationals of that State or in
its territories that may constitute an evasion of the measures
decided upon in this resolution as it may consider necessary
for the proper discharge of its duty to report to the Secu
rity Council;
21. Requests the United Kingdom, as the administering
Power, to give maximum assistance to the committee, and to
provide the committee with any information which it may re
ceive in order that the measures envisaged in this resolution
and resolution 232 (1966) may be rendered fully effective;
22. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations,
or of the specialized agencies, as well as the specialized
agencies themselves, to supply such further information as
may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of this resolution;
23. Decides to maintain this item on its agenda for
further action as appropriate in the light of developments.
APPENDIX II
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11322
Relating to grade and Other Transactions
Involving Southern Rhodesia
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Consti
tution and laws of the United States, including section 5 of
the United Nations Participation Act of 19^5 (59 Stat. 620),
as amended (22 U.S.C. 28? c), and section 301 of Title 3 of
the United States Code, and as President of the United States,
and considering the measures which the Security Council of
the United Nations, by Security Council Resolution No. 232
adopted December 16, 19-66, has decided upon pursuant to article
kl of the Charter of the United Nations and which it has
called upon all members of the United Nations, including the
United States to apply, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. The following are prohibited effective im
mediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or
licenses granted before the date of this Order:
(a) The importation into the United States of asbestos,
iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and
meat products, and hides, skins and leather originating in
Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after December 16,




(b) Any activities by any person subject to the juris
diction of the United States, which promote or are calculated
to promote the export from Southern Rhodes after December
16, I966, of any of the commodities specified in subsection
(a) of this section originating in Southern Rhodesia, and
any dealings by such person in any such commodities or in
products made therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere,
including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern
Phodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings:
Provided, however, that the prohibition against the dealing
in commodities exported from Southern Rhodesia or products
made'therefrom shall not apply to any commodities or products
which prior to the date of this Order, had been imported into
the United States.
(c) Shipment in vessels or aircraft of United States
registration of any of the commodities specified in subsection
(a) of this section originating in Southern Rhodesia and ex
ported therefrom after December 16, 1966, or products made
therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere.
(d) Any activities by any person subject to the juris
diction of the United States, which promote or are calculated
to promote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of arms,
ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles
and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and
ammunition in Southern Phodesia.
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(e) Any activities by any person subject to the juris
diction of the United States, which promote or are calculated
to promote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other air
craft and motor vehicles, and of equipment and materials for
the manufacture, assembly, or maintenance of aircraft or motor
vehicles in Southern Rhodesia; the shipment in vessels or
aircraft of United States registration of any such goods
destined for Southern Rhodesia; and any activities by any
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
which promote or are calculated to promote the manufacture or
assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia.
(f) Any participation in the supply of oil or oil pro
ducts to Southern Rhodesia (i) by any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, or (ii) by vessels or air
craft of United States registration, or (iii) by the use of
any land or air transport facility located in the United States.
Sec. 2. The functions and responsibilities for the en
forcement of the foregoing prohibitions are delegated as
follows:
(a) To the Secretary of State, the function and responsi
bility of enforcement relating to the importation into, or
exportation from the United States of articles, including
technical data, the control of the importation or exportation
of which is provided for in section 414 of the Mutual Secu
rity Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 848) as amended {22 U.S.C. 1934),
and has been delegated to the Secretary of State by section
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101 of Executive Order No. 10973 of September 3, 1961.
(b) To the Secretary of Commerce, the function and re
sponsibility of enforcement relating to-
(i) the exportation from the United States of articles
other than the articles, including technical data, referred
to in subsection (a) of this section; and
(ii) the transporation in vessels or aircraft of United
States registration of any commodities the transportation of
which is prohibited by section 1 of this Order.
(c) To the Secretary of- the Treasury, the function and
responsibility of enforcement to the extent not delegated
under subsections (a) or (b) of this section.
Sec. 3. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce shall exercise any
authority which such officer may have part from the United
Nations Participation Act of 19^5 or this Order so as to give
full effect to this Order and Security Council Resolution
No. 232.
Sec. k. (a) In carrying out their respective functions
and responsibilities under this Order, the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce shall consult with the
Secretary of State. Each such Secretary shall consult, as
appropriate, with other government agencies and private
persons.
(b) Each such Secretary shall issue such registrations,
licenses, or other authorizations as he considers necessary
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to carry out the purposes of this Order and Security Re
solution No. 232.
Sec. 5« (a) The terra "United States," as used in this
Order in a geographical sense, means all territory subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) The term "person" means an individual partnership




(F.R. Doc. 67-241; Filed, Jan. 5. 1967; 1:23 p.m.)
APPENDIX III
EXECUTIVE ORDER
Relating to Trade and Other Transactions
Involving: Southern Rhodesia
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Consti
tution and laws of the United States, including section 5 of
the United Nations Participation Act of 19^5 (59 Stat. 620),
as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and section 301 of Title 3 of
the United States Code, and as President of the United States,
and considering the measures which the Security Council of
the United Nations by Sec urity Council Resolution No. 253
adopted May 29, 1968, has decided upon pursuant to article 4-1
of the Charter of the United Nations, and which it has called
upon all members of the United Nations, including the United
States, to apply, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. In addition to the prohibitions of section
1 of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5. 1967, the follow
ing are prohibited effective immediately, not withstanding
any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the
date of this Orders
(a) Importation into the United States of any commodities
or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported
therefrom after May 29, 1968.
(b) Any activities by any person subject to the juris-
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diction of the United States which promote or are calculated
to promote the export from Southern Rhodesia after May 29, I968,
of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia»
and any dealings by any such person in any such commodities
or products, including in particular any transfer of funds
to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or
dealings; Provided, however, that the prohibition against the
dealing in commodities or products exported from Southern
Rhodesia shall not apply to any such commodities or products
which, prior to the date of this Order, had been lawfully im
ported into the United States.
(c) Carriage in vessels or aircraft of United States
resistration or under charter to any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States of any commodities or pro
ducts originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom
after May 29, 1968.
(d) Sale or supply by any person subject to the juris
diction of the United States, or any other activities by any
such person which promote or are calculated to promote the
sale or supply, to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or
to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried
on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia of any commodities
or products. Such activities, including carriage in vessels
or aircraft, may be authorized with respect to supplies in
tended strictly for medical purposes, educational equipment
and material for use in schools and other educational institu
tions, publications, news material, and foodstuffs required
by special humanitarian circumstances.
(e) Carriage in vessels or aircraft of United States
registration or under charter to any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States of any commodities or pro
ducts consigned to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia,
or to any person or body for the purposes of any business
carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia.
(f) Transfer by any person subject to the jurisdiction
of ttfe United States directly or indirectly to any person or
body in Southern Rhodesia of any funds or other financial or
economic resources. Payments exclusively for pensions, for
strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes, for
the provision of news material or for foodstuffs required by
special humanitarian circumstances may be authorized.
(g) Operation of any United States air carrier or air
craft owned or chartered by any person subject to the juris
diction of the United States or of United States registration
(i) to or from Southern Rhodesia or (ii) in coordination with
any airline company constituted or aircraft registered, in
Southern Rhodesia.
Sec. 2. The functions and responsibilities for the en
forcement of the foregoing prohibitions, and of those pro
hibitions of the Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5» 1967
specified below, are delegated as follows:
(a) To the Secretary of Commerce, the- function and re
sponsibility of enforcement relating to-
(i) the exportation from the United States of commodities
such Secretary shall consult, as appropriate, with other
government agencies and private persons.
(b) Each such Secreatry shall issue such regulations,
licenses or other authorizations as he considers necessary
to carry out the purposes of this Order and Security Council
Resolution No. 253.
Sec. 5. (a) The term "United States," as used in this
Orders in a geographical sense, means all territory subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) The term "person" means an individual, partnership,
association or other unincorporated body of individuals, or
corporation.
Sec. 6. Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5» 19^7,
implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution No.
232 of December 16, 1966, shall continue in effect as modi
fied by sections 2,3, and k of this Order.
The White House,
July 29, 1968.
(F.R.Doc 68-9212; Filed, July 29,1968; UiOk p.m.)
and products other than those articles referred to in section
2(a) of Executive Order No 11322 of January 5, 196"7; and
(ii) the carriage in vessels of any commodities or pro
ducts the carriage of which is prohibited by section 1 of this
Order or by section 1 of Executive Order No. 11322 of January
5, 196?.
(b) To the Secretary of Transportation, the function
and responsibility of enforcement relating to the operation
of air carriers and aircraft and the carriage in aircraft of
any commodities or products the carriage of which is prohibited
by section 1 of this Order or by section 1 of Executive Order
No. 11322 of January 5, 1967.
(c) To the Secretary of the Treasury, the function and
responsibility of enforcement to the extent not previously
delegated in section 2 of Executive Order No. 11322 of
January 5» 19^7» and not delegated under subsections (a) and
(b) of this section.
Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Commerce, and the Secretary of Transportation shall exercise
any authority which such officer may have apart from the
United Nations Participation Act of 19^5 or this Order so as
to give full effect to this Order and Security Council Re
solution No. 253.
Sec. 4. (a) In carrying out their respective functions
and responsibilities under this Order, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of
Transportation shall consult with the Secretary of State. Each
APPENDIX VI
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i ► Billing procedure (original
.j invoice)
— —J---> Path taken by copy Invoice
•**»**—.•>.+ Payments
Source: Center for Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy








Cape Town ort Elizateth
Principal foreign oil refineries; Mobil
Shell and B.P.
Caltex
Routes whereby oil products have reached Rhodesia:
• by ship from South Africa to Lourenco Marques (and
occasionally Beira), and then by train to Rhodesia
• by train from South Africa via Lourenco Marques to
Rhodesia
• by train from South Africa through Botswana to
Rhodesia
• by train from South Africa direct to Rhodesia (since
1974 only)
• by road from South Africa direct to Rhodesia
• from the Persian Gulf to Beira, and then by train to
Rhodesia










P.O. BOX 8442 CAUSEWAY
RHODESIA
TELEX RH2228
Our Ref : DA/EY/8135
Mobil Oil Rhodesia (Pvt) Ltd.,
P. 0. Box 791,
SALISBURY
For attention : Mr. J. B. Nicol
3rd December, 1973.
Referring to our letter 7852 of 31st July, 1973, we
attach a statement detailing estimated requirements of Petroleum
Fuels for the period January/April, 197^» These again are expressed
in cubic metres.
Mr. Atmore has taken a copy of this statement with him
on his present visit to Capetown, but we shall be obliged if you
will also pass this information to your associates. The same











RHODESIA (PVT) LTD. '-'■ ' '■ .'■
ESTTilATRD RECIITRFMENTS
JAPJUAHY - APRIL, \Wh .'




























Uur next bulk shipment is due in Durban in late Uecember, and,
althoucu our original oruer for 700 mettona may be reduced
(through a force majeure claim oy the suppliers - tisso in
Rotterdam) to 560 meltons, our bulk tans in Durban will be fairly
fall, after arrival of this saipmont.
The bull: tank, capacity 1 400 mettons, should have 1 100 mettons
in it at the^ond of December, against'an average monthly offtake
of 230 uettoua, giving 3,3 months cover,'or nearly 3,7 months
inducing the additional 20 mettona/month you will require.
Yhe next bulk import after lieceuber Hill be in Karch/April,
ihe-eiore, with your requirement of up to 60 mettons oy torch,
1974, we Jill have to woric on a bulk import arriving oefore mid-
April to insure against run-out.
i'rom this picture, you can see that He should be able to supply
your initial'requireuentii o£ o0 l!£ without too much trouble..
1974
Je have got cover for 4 050 mettons from a US Gulf source for
1974 at t'oifts U- market prices. 'ihis is in excess of current
offtake and can easily take care of your. 20 mettons/month. .
Houever, the price will be negotiated quarterly. de have already
Jot the firsc quarter price, which is up on our current price but
thiu is already taken care of in our latest prj.ee to Jemco.
fter -ae firs', quarter, prices will aloost certainly escalate
iu-. we jo not rinow to wiiai exte:it and -Jill only kiiou in ^ *■
.ipiii ior '-lie June/July ^li
In theory, tuci-eforc, .'o -'ill iu-ve adequate supplies for the
i/holw of Wi%, i<ui wo cannot aiire«jard the possibility of an
eii-uar^o of oxvoi-tt from tiie U-.», or from oouth »frica to ahodesia,
or our supplier callii.s foi-ce aajeure because of feedstock
-hell arcu their ilexjine fr-ois :.'juaan ana are probably aiore
vulnoi-iJie tl:r.n "e ara to uupplio., being cut off. i think you
can tol. ithoaoaiun inuuatrioi taut v.0 will be aule to supply them
duxino J.-.-7'l o-irriiic any ;:cvcro jrisiu, tat naturally *e oan not
aivc .•.a;.- .iu.:i-znir.a of ijr.-.i-iuity of tu^pli





oil sotmtuH iuiodjsia (ot.) up.
3U11PUD CASH!
Oaab on oall with ifarahoot Hackers at present aoounta to B31 000 000.
It la not envlsa^-ed that It will be poaslbla to rsmlt any of theae
Amda In ttia aedlua torn, I.e. within 3 years.
2#
Overdraft faollltloa are at preaant Bi62O 000. Those are not
required Tor normal day to day bualneae operations but ore available
fo^ apodal pxojeota. The ourrent rate of overdraft interact la 7&£.
cash cmuiATiaii • .^»*
It la enrlsaced thut surplus each will be generated at the rate of
R33O 000 pur oonth In 1973f reaultlag In an end-year projeotod cash
balance or U«l 360 000 before doductlng special investment oppor
tunities totalling &;l 014 OOu.
qiAHC13l
Anniini aarrlce cbargos payable to Uobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty,)
Ltd. anount to B«140 000. / •,
SALAitm AifD liL'UTED EXl'Uf3al
Projeotad 1973 Salarlse and Related amount to B£686 000 out of a total
expenditure of Sal 665 000. This represents 42,$*.
150
DOCUMENT 16
Letter from Richard van Niekerk of Mobil (Rhodesia) to R.H. Maskew of Mobil (South Africa)
DOCUMENT #16







Further to our diseuaalona of last sack we enclose herewith thraa
lie* Diegraaa oovering the arrangements that *e h*Te put In **
for the procurement of gasolines, diesol and lubricating oila.
A.D.0
Whan wa talked on the telephone the other day we Mentioned that tha
addresses for Botswana Carriers and Botswana Transport should be,
P.O. Box 1101, Johannesburg; sinca Ullrlng to you, I have obtained
tha concurrence of Kesars. Coley and Ward respectively for the use
of their organisation*• naaes. Rather than use P.O. Box 11C1,
Johannesburg forabqth accounts wa dees it adTlaabla that you should
use a different SSsSSmto for Botswana Transport; the full address
that we propose that you use is recorded on the Floe Diagraa. If
you are able to think up a suitable third name for invoicing purposes,
we sole that you kindly reoord that aaaa on the Plow Diagram and advise
ua of the organisation involved. It will be necessary to prepare
invoice pads for that organisation so that they sight be able to re-
Invoice Rand Oils with tha volumes invoiced, to thm by MOSA (froa tha
How on the right hand sida of tha chertrand fro* Botswana Carriers
to be re-invoiced to Minerals Exploration (from the flow on tha left
hud aide of tha chart).
Petar Faura is thoroughly au fait with thaae arraageaenta and it
would ba necessary for Una, to write to tha organisation that you
propose using, spelling out what it la that wa want of the*.
Tha Important feature of this plan is that tha original billings by
KOSA to the two or three organisations in tha top ™"* and tha
subsequent re-billing by those organisations to tha second line and
ultimately tha third re-billings by tha second liao to tha third 1W
are, to all intents and purposes, Meaningless and are Merely our falsa
trail being laid. The important and action doeuaeat is tha copy of
VOSA's invoice which will flow along the dotted lino direct to
Minerals Exploration} that is to say that whea MOSA biUa Botswana
Carriers a duplicate of that invoice is to be sailed in a sealed
envelope direct to Minerals Exploration, Breaau*oatain,
0a receipt of this duplicato, Minerals Exploration will type onto
their invoice pad tha aaaa information billing Genta, c/o tha
Ratherlands Bank. Minerals Exploration will, saae weeks later, receive
aa invoice via testers Transvaal Develspaent, if wa follow the cento*
ooluan of the Flew Diagr&a, containing precisely the saae infaraatioa aa
was contained oa tha duplicate which they received and billed Ccnta,
Since the %eatem Transvaal developaeat invoice will oarry the aaaa
auaber as tha duplicate frea HOSA there will bo aa risk of duplioaUeai
aa aa additional aafeguard. Minerals Exploration have been instructed to
ignore invoices flowing to thaa froa tha iatanwdiarloa but to bill only
oa duplicatea received froa M03A direat.
M0SA*a two or thraa stateaents billing Botswana Carriers, Botswana
transport and tha third account are to be seat dlraet to Minerals
Exploration la a sealed envelope, they will la turn Bail these daouaeats
to us sad as will conduct a rooonoiliatlea of tha accounts bar*.
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Centa will have authorised the Netherlands Back to pay trm their
revolving letter of Credit, invoicee rendered to them by Minerals
Exploration Co. in raapect of Supplies of Mobil Dlaael. CB
payment of such Invoices by tha Bank, they will forward th« invoices
- to Cent* woo will conduct thair oma reconciliation of withdraw!*
fra« thair revolving Letter of Credit, A duplicate of Mineral*
Exploration Invoice will be mailed-to MOSK for statistical
purpoaaa.
This payment proeadvira will greatly spaad up tha ultlaata raoaipt
by your goodaelvea of payaanta and we foresee tharefara, a
subatantial raduation In tha T.A.B. aa praaantly raflaotad against
Anglo American's number two or developmenWsacoiint.
Tou might consider that tha procedure that we have adopted is
unduly complicated and unnecessary, but as was oonTayad to you
whan you war* hare, it is tha wish of Geargv'a people that wa
lnrolTa and complicate this mattar to a far greater degree
pertains at present la tha hope that It will dlsoourage an
investigation*
The principle as expounded in detail under A.D.O. above applies to
Gasolines and we have received Saeol's concurrence hereto.
They will from the eoamencement of thair September Aooounting Month
open three trade aooounts, one each in the name of Band Oils,
Minerals Exploration and Western Transvaal Development and Exploration
Company, billing these three organisations on a rotational basis.
Xa turn the aoeount* billed will re-bill as is depicted on the diagram
and ultimately Minerals Exploration will reoeive a billing for tha
gasoline whloh passes from Sssol to us.
Sasol have agreed to create aa an action document a duplicate of thair
original billing passing this direct to Minerals Exploration.
Minerals Exploration will then bill Geata c/o the Netherlands Bank
and paaa a copy of Sasol's invoice to us for statistical purposes.
Tha payment route will be as for A.D.O. whereby Minerals Exploration
will ba paid by tha Netherlands Bank from funds held under a revolving
lattar of oradlt issued by Genta; aa auoh payment to Sasol will be
■ads at more frequent intervals than hitherto and in turn payments
from Sasol to you should be speeded up*
Lubricating Products <i#»_
We have obtained Semco'a Agreement to our opening a number 3 account
1b their name at the address of their Attorneys. The Attorneys will
reoeive the original billing from HOSA together with a copy of a
loading note. On receipt of theaa documents they will type onto a
Semoo invoice pad a simplified version of the contents of MOSA's
original invoice, billing on a rotational basis,*Sand Oils, Village
Mala Distributors and Western Transvaal Developsaat. The MOSA
invoice will than be mailed la a sealed envelope to Minerals Exploration.
This latter organisation will than on thair invoice pad bill Becom
of Rhodesia ertraoting the detailed information from the Mobil invoice,
and of course, giving their Invoice the aame nuwber aa UOSA's. In
the aaae way aa- we deacribeAfor AJ3.0. ultimately aa invoice will
come to Minerals Exploration froa oaa or the other of the intermediaries
quoting the same number as the invoice that has come to Minerals
'Exploration along the direct route but this will ba ignored by Minerals
Exploration since they will have already billed Baoam.
Semoo's handling charges will be raised on a separata debit by
the legitimate Saaco organisation froa the information contained
on tha loading note whloh will have passed from tha Somco number
3 set-up to Sameo.
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L?1? ""fTaat.gea which both yourselves and ourselvee
had to contend with under tha old set-up ... tha delay
in tha receipt of payaent from Seaco by yourselves and the
■Maxous^ountlng discrepancies wfaiaa occurred then Seaco
r^-ln»oicad ua. Undar the propoeed Mthod It will ba we -bo
oonduct tha raoonotUation of tha Seaco number 3 account and
■111 have a direet control over tha peyaanta being made againat
that account. Undar tha preaant irru(u»ti m pay Seaco
on receipt of goods, but we know, that thay dalay up to 90 days
before passing tbaee payments to you. Dndar our proposed
arrangements ve will oontlnua to pay via Minerals Exploration
to tha Durban Attomay on the racaipt of gooda, aa this payaent
•111 be mada into tha Attarwy'a truat aocount and accompaniad
oy fuU dataila of ahat ia baing paid ha will ba obliged to
pua tha funda to MOSA pronptly. TMa propoaal therefore,
•zcludaa Saaoo'a aocountiag organisation entirely from thia
prooureaant prograwia, but doaa not ia any aay altar tha
proeedun. aa applied to the phyaio»l aspect of tha tranaactiona.
Seaco ia Jacob* will continue to reeelve eonaignaant details of
wucka, they will ba responsible for tjja oustoaa clearing of
aaae and oonaigningj thay nil alao oontiaue to be responsible
for nailing to ua proaptly auoh euatou' doauBanta aa are
aaceaaary to facUitata cuatoaia clearances at the dastinationa
la wlew of what Mr. Baker had said about tha oontinued
■atiafactory reUUonahip between Stuo and yourselves we did
not broaoh tha subject of handling ohargea but left thU matter
on tha saae baais aa hitherto. -
Serriee Charges
It has been necessary to commit ouraelvea to _
to certain of the organisations who are aotiag









Seaco Number 3 Aocount,











Aa Mesara. Uinarala Exploration aod Vooaey Ford, ia that
order will have the greatest amount of retyping and re-direoting
. to do we expaet their ohargea to be rather more than the
nominal figurea quoted to ua by Weatern Transvaal Development
and Band Oils.
then m have had aa opportunity of aaseeaing our annual
Involvement in service charges *a will if we consider it
Boeeaaary, sake representation to Santa for seae relief.
to trust that the Flow Olagruu aad the foregoing ia sufficiently
explicit, but if there are any points o* which you require
clarification please revert.
BlUlnga to Genta
You will recall that la June I Bade representations to you with
the request that the abnormal freight elaaent be included la
•oathly billings to Genta rather than be the subjeet of a separate
debit.
On the 27th June, your people wrote to Hooaablque, reference W
Code HC&-56OOC, adviaiag Uoeamblqua that with effeot from tha
July accounting aonth the billings to the varioua organisations
would be aa fallows i
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South African cent* par gall.
■ ■ • « •
of this oopy letter ■• informed ttenta of the July charga










A. >ara ve«i»ly »■•» that Saaol naa r«o«i»ia« reaunaration for
5.S^."l« but Mp..fd th. ..rric. fM to h»« *"« J^1^
in the figure .dTiaad by you to ua aa baias th. applieabU ^f^
wta. ThiToontantlon Ur.iafon.ad by tto tolas *ich oa.. fro.
Cap* Tom oa th. 12th Auguat, 1963 :
-09309 09951 FOR VAN KIEE2RX AlKBST CHAECE OOTS
nnaoi 10.3 rkculab 8.5 jet 10.7 a.d.o. 8a ah
S.A. CENTS PEE IMPERIAL CALLOW 56OOC"
all thia ia that





Supolv Salea Prealua «■
—
aoeow>datioa arran««a.at oaa ba iaplaaantod by thaa.
you can apare in ezoaaa of our
formrd to hearing fro. you, with kind peraoaal regarda.
Yours aiaearaly.
Riohard ima Niakarlc.
Mobil (Rhodesia) Memorandum describing importation paper-chases.





Whan orders tor lubricants and solvents are placed on our South African asso
ciates, a ourefully plunnad "paper onaaa" la used to disguise tha final daeti-
natloa of theee products. Xhl* is necessary In order to moke aura that there
la no link between H03A and ilOSfl'a supplies.
What happens la this i—
IIOSB places ordaro for lubes aod grouses on Chemiao through Warriok tejd In
Oantxal Heglon, 110SA, then sell to Chaalao *uj la turn supuly U0S£.
Sho order Is billed and consigned by UQ3& to Chsoloo Ho. 3 Aceouat with tha
Durban attorneys, Kooaay Tord, and Partnara' box ouaber* Uooney lord and Part-
n«ra then ufiJca out tm debits) the first of these Is to Mineral iicplaratlon
Serrloaa) and the other to either «-
Band OUs
Ylllaga Main Slatrlbutors, or
W.T. Cevelfipaent
la turn olxoulata it to tha other (e.g. Village Mala Distributors debits
Oils) before It finally ygnln oomaa to Mineral Exploration, Mineral
Exploration aot on tha first advise and debit Beoom of BhodeelA (iSDSa). Pajnent
la aade by UOSB to Cnealoo No. 3 aocouat through Uoonay Toxd and Partners.
A ilnilar set up, but uslns different parties Is used for tha proouremsnt of
MlTents.
t>^. "paper ohase" ahloh eosts Tory Uttla to udalnlflter, la dona primarily *°
hide the fast that M03A is in fast supplying UOSB with produot la ooatraYentlaa
of U.S. Sanctions Regulations.
It la reooamasdad that no attempt be made to change tha present prooureoeok a%%
up, becausei-
1) The ooat is minimfti
2) It is not too cumbersome
3) Zt la norklng efficiently, and
4) Any risks resulting fron a change in tha system would be bourne by
U02A and we should therefore leave it up to them to reduce tha extent
of tha "paper chase" if they deem fit.
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Northern Beglon t Ron Clover
Central Begloa i Waxriolc Wurd
Jaok Hllllard
Oape Tom I £• Bedford
H. Camp




L.U. i C. C. Halaaandarla (through B. OloTer, B. Bedford,, B. Camp)
Other
1) freight Services, P.O. Box 1101, JQHAjarE3B0B0 i A.B. Uoxrta or B.O. Velar
2) Tillage Ualn Ilatrlbutora, S.Q. Box 324,
Biyanotoa .. I Ura. Abbs Beard
3) Band Oils, P.O. Box 2561, JOHAloUSBUBO I Darld 9. Patrick
4) 'Western Transvaal Development, -P.O. Bex 396,
LIOHTEMUEO I A.J. Oberholaer, «tao la a
lawyer
5) Seno l *• laherwod and Slokanoon,
the coloured txuok deapatohar
6) Oaxltaa, P.O. Box 6873, JOHAMJSSBiraa t a. 8oXoma
7) Oonaolldated Stevedoring A Tornardlag Agenoy,
P.O. Box 3 Point, NAXA1 I B. WiaUeaan
a) OUCCa Deokar & lodd, P.O. Box 3362, I Attorney* oontaat Mr. J.X.
JOHiUDIESflUEO Jaaper
9) Itooney, Itord & Partnara, DUBBAH i Attorneys oontaot Mr. Dugjmre
10) Baeol * K.O. Steyn or B.B. Buys
11) Minerals Exploration « read Prelght Serrloea.
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the above plus others, as applicable, are sent lottery tlokats at OhrlatnM
with a letter of appreciation.
REPIHE1) ITtODUCT3 (excluding eolventa and aome aviation)
Ob the fUa or It, It la a Straight transaotion botneoa ourselves and Genta.
Produot la reoelved from them baaed on our etooJc from our Depot atooJc -
levels aa proTided by Mr. J. Gray and ha llaaea with Centa oa Produot Jfave-
neat. The produot la reoelved by Depot at 20°0 and theae quantities are
used for payment purposes. There are, however, additional aapoeta to this I-
(a) Genta Aiiooatlon — Genta alluaates to SbbU the importation of
Premium, Regular, ADO, and Aytur. Avtur la Impoxied on behalf of
Industry despite frequent attempts by Shell to stop thlsi they ol&la
produot oontaslnatlon ato. Thia la resolved by a aampla to them from
eaoh batoh, Mule UobU lnporta Artur, other ooaipanlea lmnrt kerasene
avgua eto. Geata makes theae allAoatlons eTery four months and we aond
our alloeatloa figures to Vr, S. Bedford, who Informs S ft 0 who In turn
Uaoee with the Centa agent.
(l) Petrol - The attached sahadula shows the method wosrsby Genta Is
debited by Moraf* You will note that there are three 'agents'i-
A. ' Hand Oils
B, W.X. Derelapmeat
0. Ulnsrals Szploratlsn*
Rand Oils and W.T, Deyelopaent are purely a "papor-ohaae" and
Minerals Exploration debits Gonta at Bhodtslaa Mlaalon, MarltlOB
House, Johanceaburg.
(2)
ilP0 - Itoref debits the libtor and Industrial Transport using the
Minerals Exploration box aumbari Ulnerals iiqpOoratlon la turn debl
Genta la the same way as patrol.
(3) Artur - Geata la billed direst by freight Seirioae.
XX ATUTIOIf REPIWBD
(a) ATgas US/145 for Air Vrans Africa ordered by telex on Bon Glover of
northern Region ftr for owWward tranamlsalon to L.M. Glover advises -
details on availability eto. to Hoar. Maaa debits either XreJc or Oarlb/
who debits Genta In Johannesburg. Payment by Host to Ganta is dons oa
the same basis aa Refined above.
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(o) Avgaa 60 as per (a) above
(o) Avgaa 100/130 Imported from Shall by Cent*. Our supplies are obtained
Ex Centa.
Ill SOLVEH'CS
Xhaee ara obtained tram, i-
(a) Toluol and iylol Ex I3C0H and paid for via ISGOli, Bulaneyo.
(b) Petroplne and White 3plrlt Ex Kubet Evans Durban and paid for b/
3aok Draft.
(0) Others Ex Northern Region via Srelgat Services Flasooa aocount.
Product, la BRlnly In bulk.
IT CUES Aim PETROL ATIE3
Indents are dependent uponi-
(a) Import allocations
(b) Forward requirements as determlnod by Oommeroial Separtaent.
Ordera ar* Initiated agalaati
aiohard Dagglt ' .




Xho above ara aakad for prioea, avallAblllty, taohnloal datalla ato, ajvi
la the casa of ACL, depending on agents reaponee, they ara aakad to aontaat
their ageuls. Should a quota be aaoeptablat aa Agroaaeat of Sale la entered
lato and the agent Instructedj inauranoe taken out| iaport peralt and order
laaued etu. All the above agents are paid looally axoapt ACL oa a Latter of
Credit and Seaoo on a Bank Draft.
ASPHALTS
(a) Industrial 1 Xhaaa are obtained Ex Moref by Semoo, A telex or phone
oall is and* »o W. Hard giving partloulara and af'f1ne tor details.
(b) Boad h^Jcla,? i These ara obtained Ex Centa In the nonaal *ay in
Centa la dealt with.
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8PEOL.L ?nODUCT3
examples «ax aoulaloas, titute oils eto. the Initial approach la made by
letter or tolephoae to northern Begion (Olover), Central Hegion (Ward) or
Cape Tom (Oxeaham) for prioes and availability. A permit la applied for,
IX neceaaary, dependent on product and an order la paaeed on either fr-algae
S or Carl(as.
Mr. la^o la responsible for placing the orttirs ahlah are Initiated on the
advise of tir. Jaokaoa.
TIX LIQOID PETROLEUM GA3
I.P. dua la obtained froa Genta (who obtain It Ex Soaarep and Saaol). Mr
leege la responsible for the orders whioh are made aoooiding to atook ley«la.
Till L.P. iii\
Shea* can be divided into i»
(a) Xooal lionufooture e.g. Moaaruh
(d) Imported ltens siaioh are ourrentljr Oadaa equipment, and northern Sagtoa
(yla Carltaa) for Koaanxas regulators.
Soli funotlon la oontrollad by Ur. GoJOMhsr.
Orders for l.P.Gaa equipment require Import Uoenoes and the toIum of import
la therefore regulated. Mr. P. Preston la responsible for keeping Interested
parties Infozmed of the level of ourrenoy allocations.
Ollfl AUD (51EASE3 (iferof ramfaoturo)
Zho Indent for these Is dona by Mr. legge. The prooedure Is ta do a firm Inc
by product,, paak and destination monthly ud against this supplementary ladei
oaa be made.. In addition anticipated future months indent la dons purely foi
rsflnery planning purposea. This indant la controlled by Mr. Legge la col
laboration with w. Ward (Central Beglon)* The indant is billed and oonslgnet
by Mosa to Semoo Ho. 3 Aeoount with the Durban Attorneys, Uooney Jbzd, box
number. In regard to the billing Kooney foxi. site out t«o debits | the flrr





who la turn olroulato it to the other ( e.g. Tillage Main Distributor* debit
5/
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to P.O. Box 39, 3out*rton or
of 1.
i. 3 Loouat Om «) dua to .raviou. 4.1a,. «-ouuf»d
SerrlBM «ro paid and than Msoney lord.
Mr. legoa ia raaponaiUa for aU ordaro.
on order .uantiUa. and «it« to I.
1^1 oto. On raooip^ o* «*. i^o^tion tt.




















To eon.ider th* alternative proeur*-*nt rout** availably to
us with a vi*w to aacartaialntf volcn 1* U» «o*t aconoalcai,
an4 vbleh on* to utl.li.ao *taould th* ■«•« o«ono«lo*l rout*
b* eloped to u*.
•2.1. Boad tnaaport la bulk to Bulawayo and Sali*bury.
2^2. Kail via Botswana to d.atlnatl*«« la «aod**ia.
2.3. l£a*t Coaat mhlpptng to Lour«neo Marqu** and B*ira,
and rail to destination* la RiMxtesla.
to* purpo»«» ot thi« *tudy Bulawayo and Salisbury
£To£?d..tl»atlotta to b. «««ld.ra«. ~ th*y ar.





raaala out of action.
4, Lubricating Oil* ,
lubrioatiatf oil* aro traaa»lpp«i fro. Durbao to
our purohaaa*.
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ATTACHMENT 3.
N -.N-FINAMCIAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Lubricating Oils and Graaaea
In tho aarly 196Ota the bast Coast routa via Louranco
Jarjut. andyD«ira was u.ad to supply point, in **>*••*••
This was changed (prior to U.D.I.) for th. following reasons.
1.1. Thora war* oouaiderabla dalays on this
routs, delays which ar. not exp.rt.encd
whan the rail routa is used.
1.2. Tha incidence of dsjaa*. to produot on this
routs was hl£h.
1.3. Kor suppliss destined for Bulawaye th. rail
routs was «ors economical.
n t it baca.au naceasary to i«poss cartala ssourlty
' so a-^ot to link Mobil South Africa with Mobil
the East Coast rout, was, thsrsror.,
for th. following raasonsi-
. i it was" easier to hav. on. purchaslnG a««»t in
v south Afxioa(SEHCU) with whom to deal, rath.r
than bavins a purehasl»«-a«ent in South Afrioa
Ind forwarding- asant. in, Louranco Marquss and
B.ira. (Notei The additional agency oharg..
would not si«nlficantly affect ths econo«ic. of
the Cast Coast routs).
l ^ Vlth th. liaat Coast bsins under heavy surr.lilanc.
it waaconsid.rad undsslrabls to hav. Mobil dru«.
stacked at Moaaablqu. ports, svsa thoueh th. nammm
on th. drums had bssa painted out.
1 6. Mobil la Lour«»co Marquss and Bsira would hav.
dothine to do with such arransMtsats.
Th. point. m«tlon.d abov. still p.rtain today and ahould b.
considered whan deciding on supply ««ttt**»
Industrial Bituaana
Until fairly r.c.ntly th. supply routs f»' ^^'^
and rail ths product to Salisbury or
162
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noari Transport In built to Bulawayo
and Saliaburv ( matt attachment 2).
4.1.1. The praaent coat or a»vln« lubricating ell*
la thla nanner !■
Durb«n/Sallabury
Durban/Bulawayo
3.7633 centa per Utrt
2.8990 oast* per li.tr*.
4.1.2. Our roed trmasport oparatura bava, howavar,
indicated to ua that Uvay wiah to lncraaaa ttaaa*
prlcaa In the near futura. Tne prop«»a<i »*w
prloaa ar»«-
Durb*n/Sallabury 3.9595 oenta per litre
D»rban/Dulawayo 3.to96 cent* per lltn»
, Kai.1 via Botswna In drum t» "uUmvo and Sallabury.
fc.2.1. Durban/Sallabury 3.7107 eanta per
kXZ. Ourban/Dul»«y 5'0?6? •«•• *#r
. Baat Coast uhlpplwt t» L.M. «n«< B«lr>. and rail
from port to deaf "«**«*«« m aaodaala




etc 1.7023 cente per litre
. 3.7659 eeata per litre
5.4682 cents per litre
4.3.2. Durban/Deira/ .
Sallaburyi . '
Ocean fralsat ate 2*1469 cents per litre
•ullage 2.9912 eeats per litre
5.1381 cents per litre
To tbeee prices »uat be added any agency fees
which we would have to iaeur tfcreuga u»la« this
route. . ■ .:*■•; ;..■•>
4.4. Racoancndatlon for Pirocuraayant Route of
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4.4.1. Lubricating Oils at Praaant tranahloped In Bulk.
As can be seen from the above, transhipping
costs are lowest whan lubricating oils are
transported by road tank wagons In bulk.
This Is our present routs of supply for the
majority of our lubricating olla and It la
recommended that we continue using this rout*
for as long as we are able to secure the
accessary Uoad Transport Carrisra certificates.
If at some time la the future we are unable
to utilise this route du* to the withdrawal
of our certificates, the rail route via
Botswana should be used to supply Bulawayo,
and the East Coast route via Beira, to supply
Salisbury. (The us* of the east coast rout*
jw*uL***> —y^~***- s**^3 ^—-j ±m og eours* d*p*nd*at on tasr* b«l&s no
^^ji JjU~*y. /w*^ . 1 advarsa saeurlty or publicity risk iavolvsd.)
4.4.2. Lubricating Olla at Preaent Imported In Drum*.
We at present Import the slower moving oil*
la drums by rail via Botswana.
V* recoosoead that this routs be retained for,
supplies consigned to Bulawayo, but bellsv*
that supplies dsstlaed for Salisbury ahnuld
us* the East Coast route (if security
considerations allow this).
GREASES
At present all lubricating greases are transported by rail via,
Botswana to Salisbury and Bulawayo* (Oreases can only be
transhipped la drums).
Tb* alternative routes sad oosts for transhipping greases »rei*
5.X. By Hall via Botswana to Bulawayo and Salisbury.
5.1JLJ>urban/Sallsbury 6.6623 cents per kg.
5.1.2. Durban/nui**»y» ' 5.8995 casts per kg.
5.2. East Coast Shipping to L.M. and Belra. and Hall to
destination in Ehodeaia.
5.2.1. Durban/L.M./Bulawayo 6.3796 cants per kg.
5.2.2. Durban/Deira/Salisbury 5*99*5 cants per kg.
5.3. / ...
